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INTRODUCTION	Who	voted	for	President	Trump?	Why	did	his	supporters	vote	for	him?	After	the	2016	Presidential	Election,	these	questions	were	of	pressing	concern	as	people	tried	to	make	sense	of	President	Trump’s	unexpected	victory.	Since	polls	nationwide	predicted	that	former	Secretary	of	State	Hillary	Clinton	would	come	out	on	top	(Bomey,	2016),	pundits	and	scholars	alike	spent	much	of	their	post-election	analysis	focusing	on	Trump	supporters.	I	did	the	same	for	my	senior	thesis,	choosing	to	conduct	interviews	with	Trump	supporters	at	Boston	College.	Post-primary	and	post-election	analyses	in	the	mainstream	press	largely	focused	on	President	Trump’s	working-class	white	support:	the	“blue	collar,”	“rural”	Middle	Americans	to	whom	President	Trump	was	purportedly	more	appealing	than	the	more	politically	established	candidates	on	both	sides	of	the	aisle	(Confessore,	2016;	Coontz,	2016;	Evich,	2016;	Robinson,	2016;	Swaine,	2016;	Weisberg,	2016).	Many	academics	took	a	similar	approach,	paying	special	attention	to	President	Trump’s	working-class	white	support	in	their	explanations	for	the	outcome	of	the	2016	U.S.	Presidential	Election	(Inglehart	&	Norris,	2016;	Turney	et	al.,	2017;	Gidron	&	Hall,	2017).	But	what	does	the	“white	working	class”	entail?	Many	of	the	aforementioned	analyses	use	education	as	a	“proxy	for	class”	(Turney	et	al.,	2017,	p.	2):	simply	put,	if	one	does	not	have	a	college	degree,	then	one	is	deemed	a	member	of	the	working	class.	In	reality,	though,	class	is	far	more	complicated	than	whether	or	not	one	has	a	college	degree.	This	is	especially	true	when	looking	at	non-college	educated	whites,	
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a	group	of	people	who—despite	their	lack	of	a	college	degree—still	benefit	from	the	racial	wealth	gap	that	plagues	American	society	to	this	day	(Darity	et	al.,	2018).	Some	members	of	the	press	(Carnes	&	Lupu,	2017;	Silver,	2016)	and	social	science	scholars	(Walley,	2017;	Manza	&	Crowley,	2017;	Bhambra,	2017)	have	been	wary	of	the	working-class	narrative	surrounding	President	Trump’s	rise	to	the	presidency.	This	perspective	is	important,	as	one	could	make	a	solid	argument	that	President	Trump	is	more	of	an	advocate	for	the	elite	than	the	working	class.	My	research	challenges	narratives	of	Trump’s	working	class	support	by	showing	how	he	appeals	to	non-working	class	individuals	at	an	elite	academic	institution	like	Boston	College.	In	order	to	understand	why	my	interviewees	support	President	Trump,	I	sought	to	uncover	the	narrative	frames	and	discourses	that	they	used	in	their	support	for	President	Trump.	This	approach	draws	heavily	from	the	work	of	Hochschild	(2016),	who	used	qualitative	sociological	research	methods	in	an	attempt	to	understand	the	perspectives	of	Tea	Partiers	in	Louisiana.	Though	Hochschild’s	subjects	were	similar	to	mine	in	terms	of	conservative	political	perspectives,	the	differences	in	our	populations—Hochschild’s	being	Tea	Partiers	facing	institutional	decay	in	the	South;	mine	being	largely	upper	and	upper-middle	class	Trump	supporters	at	a	wealthy	New	England	university—engendered	different	articulations	of	why	they	identify	as	conservatives.	While	Hochschild’s	subjects	largely	rejected	narratives	of	victimization,	I	found	that	my	interviewees	were	willing	to	frame	themselves	as	victims.	In	addition,	the	phenomenon	of	voting	against	one’s	own	interests	is	far	more	applicable	to	Hochschild’s	population	than	
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my	interviewee	pool:	while	Hochschild	outlines	how	Tea	Partiers	in	Louisiana	continue	to	support	conservative	politicians	despite	the	institutional	decay	that	has	resulted	from	a	lack	of	government	spending	in	the	area,	my	interviewees’	support	for	Trump	is	much	more	clearly	aligned	with	their	own	interests—especially	with	regards	to	taxes	and	retention	of	personal	wealth.	
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LITERATURE	REVIEW	The	2016	U.S.	Presidential	Election	has	been	a	subject	of	much	discussion	in	the	social	sciences.	In	analyzing	President	Trump’s	electoral	victory,	scholars	have	looked	into	both	economic	and	cultural	drivers	of	Trump	support.	Evidence	indicates	that	the	influence	of	“cultural	backlash”	(Turney	et	al.,	2017,	p.	1)	outweighed	that	of	“economic	displacement”	(Turney	et	al.,	2017,	p.	1)	(Inglehart	&	Norris,	2016;	Schaffner	et	al.,	2018;	Turney	et	al.,	2017),	or	that,	at	the	very	least,	economic	and	cultural	factors	interacted	in	similarly	influential	ways	(Gidron	&	Hall,	2017).	Due	to	the	privileged	economic	standing	of	my	interviewee	pool,	the	influence	of	economic	displacement	was	minimal	amongst	my	interviewees;	this	paper	builds	on	findings	that	indicate	the	importance	of	cultural	backlash	in	the	2016	U.S.	Presidential	Election.	Beyond	why	college-educated	individuals	support	President	Trump,	this	paper	is	also	concerned	with	perceptions	of	who	voted	for	President	Trump.	Walley	(2017)	writes	about	the	phenomenon	of	the	“white	working	class”	that	has	dominated	much	of	the	post-election	analysis.	Though	class	is	a	complex	and	multi-faceted	concept,	post-election	analyses	have	measured	class	on	the	simple	basis	of	education	level.	This	understanding	of	class	is	quite	misleading,	as	it	lumps	together	Wall	Street	millionaires	with	elementary	school	teachers	in	the	non-working	class	and	small-business	owners	with	service	workers	in	the	working	class	(Walley,	2017,	p.	232).	More	problems	arise	in	this	conflation	of	education	with	class	when	one	considers	the	impact	of	race.	Data	compiled	from	the	Center	for	American	Progress	(CAP)	estimates	that	whites	make	up	over	70%	of	the	voting	population	(Griffin	et	
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al.,	2017,	p.	6).	Moreover,	whites	are	the	only	race	for	which	the	majority	voted	for	President	Trump	(Griffin	et	al.,	2017,	p.	18).	Thus,	it	is	not	inaccurate	to	say	that	President	Trump’s	voter	base	is	distinctly	white.	The	whiteness	of	the	typical	Trump	voter	is	paramount	when	discussing	their	class	position.	In	a	country	where	the	median	white	household	without	a	high	school	diploma	has	more	wealth	than	the	median	black	household	with	a	college	degree	(Darity	et	al.,	2018,	p.	6),	it	is	inaccurate	to	assume	that	non-college	educated	whites	are	all	economically-strapped,	working-class	individuals.	This	is	especially	true	when	looking	at	the	non-college	educated	whites	that	voted	for	Trump.	In	their	article	for	the	Washington	Post	titled	“It’s	time	to	bust	the	myth:	Most	Trump	voters	were	not	working	class,”	Duke	professor	Nicholas	Carnes	and	Vanderbilt	professor	Noam	Lupu	find	that	nearly	60	percent	of	non-college	educated	white	Trump	voters	were	in	the	top	half	of	the	income	distribution	(i.e.,	making	more	than	$50,000).	Moreover,	they	found	that	one	in	five	non-college	educated	white	Trump	voters	had	a	household	income	of	over	$100,000.	The	fact	of	the	matter	is	that	Trump	supporters,	in	general,	were	fairly	affluent:	one-third	had	household	incomes	at	or	below	$50,000,	one-third	had	household	incomes	between	$50,000	and	$100,000,	and	one-third	had	household	incomes	of	$100,000	or	more	(Carnes	&	Lupu,	2017).	In	addition,	I	would	hesitate	to	associate	Trump	supporters	with	low	levels	of	education.	Though	CAP	data	on	the	2016	election	results	shows	that	non-college	educated	white	voters	swung	to	Trump	in	key	states	such	as	Michigan,	Pennsylvania,	and	Wisconsin	(Griffin	et	al.,	2017),	such	findings	should	not	be	used	as	an	excuse	to	ignore	the	large	number	of	college-educated	whites	who	still	
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supported	Trump.	According	to	CAP	data	comparing	2012	and	2016	election	results,	white	college-educated	support	for	the	Republican	presidential	candidate	fell	from	48.7	percent	in	2012	to	43.0	percent	in	2016,	while	support	for	the	Democratic	presidential	candidate	only	increased	from	49.4	percent	to	50.1	percent.	This	means	that—in	an	election	where	a	third-party	vote	was	essentially	a	vote	for	Trump,	as	former	President	Obama	said	himself	(Parkinson,	2016)—white	college-educated	support	for	third-party	candidates	rose	from	two	percent	in	2012	to	seven	percent	in	2016	(Griffin	et	al.,	2017,	p.	18).	The	more	than	40	percent	support	for	Trump	amongst	college-educated	whites	is	a	significant	proportion	by	itself.	Add	on	the	fact	that	so	many	college-educated	whites	voted	for	third-party	candidates,	and	one	could	argue	that	college-educated	whites	are	less	opposed	to	President	Trump	than	advertised.	Manza	&	Crowley	(2017)	estimate	that	the	median	Trump	voter	makes	$17,000	more	than	the	median	American,	and	that	the	average	Trump	voter	has	more	years	of	education	than	their	state’s	average	resident.	Their	paper	reminds	us	that	President	Trump—despite	the	framing	of	him	as	a	champion	of	the	working-class—embodies	a	form	of	populism	that	is	“distinctly	non-redistributive”:	he	supports	tax	cuts	for	wealthy	households,	business-friendly	deregulation,	and	corporate	tax	cuts	(Manza	&	Crowley,	2017,	p.	9).	Bhambra	(2017)	aptly	describes	Trump	supporters	not	as	unique	victims	of	systemic	economic	changes,	but	as	a	group	of	people	suffering	a	“relative	loss	of	privilege”	(p.	S226).	This	is	not	to	say	that	President	Trump	is	devoid	of	any	working-class	support;	rather,	it	is	a	call	for	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	be	working-class	in	the	
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United	States.	Such	an	understanding	may	lead	one	to	reconsider	the	influence	of	class	anxiety	in	the	rise	of	President	Trump.	In	terms	of	answering	the	question	of	who	voted	for	President	Trump,	my	thesis	builds	upon	the	work	of	critical	race	theorists	and	whiteness	studies	scholars	who	highlight	how	whites	of	all	economic	classes	have	historically	worked	together	in	upholding	the	white	supremacist	social	order.	Lipsitz’s	(1995)	term	“possessive	investment	in	whiteness”	accurately	describes	how	white	Americans	often	choose	to	invest	in	themselves	rather	than	the	common	good.	Post-World	War	II	trade	unions	are	an	example	of	this	phenomenon,	as	they	focused	on	unionizing	white	mass-production	agencies	rather	than	pushing	for	goals	such	as	full	employment	and	universal	healthcare	that	would	have	benefitted	people	of	all	races.	In	general,	Lipsitz	(1995)	outlines	how	predominantly	white	“political	coalitions,”	both	on	the	left	and	on	the	right,	propose	seemingly	race-neutral	policies	(from	the	New	Deal	to	1980s	federal	tax	laws)	that,	in	effect,	only	serve	to	benefit	fellow	white	people.	From	this	perspective,	it	is	clear	how	the	interests	of	a	working-class	white	individual	in	the	Midwest	would	align	with	the	interests	of	a	college-educated	white	individual	in	the	Northeast.	Another	interesting	way	to	frame	how	whiteness	operates	is	Alexander’s	(2010)	idea	of	“racial	bribes.”	From	Bacon’s	Rebellion	in	the	late	17th-century	(when	the	planter	class	gave	special	privileges	to	poor	whites	over	Native	Americans	in	order	to	prevent	a	cross-racial	class	rebellion),	to	Clinton’s	Crime	Bill	nearly	three	hundred	years	later	(when	the	Democrats	adopted	conservative	tough-on-crime	policies	to	appeal	to	white	swing	voters),	white	elites	have	a	history	of	doling	out	
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“racial	bribes”	to	lower	class	whites	at	the	expense	of	nonwhites.	When	considering	the	working-class	whites	who	support	President	Trump,	I	think	it	is	useful	to	understand	Trump’s	presidential	campaign	as	part	of	this	long	history	of	“racial	bribes”	in	America.	Perhaps	the	easiest	way	to	understand	this	whiteness	perspective	is	through	the	lens	of	W.E.B.	Du	Bois.	Du	Bois	argues	that	racism	is	a	global	force	that	benefits	whites	of	all	class	positions	in	its	disproportionate	distribution	of	economic	resources	according	to	the	color	line	(Du	Bois,	1915).	This	perspective	urges	us	to	reconsider	the	separation	of	“economic	displacement”	and	“cultural	backlash”	in	explanations	of	President	Trump’s	white	working-class	support;	Du	Bois’	work	outlines	how	the	culture	of	racism	is	inherently	tied	to	the	economic	subjugation	of	people	of	color	around	the	world	(Du	Bois,	2007).	Du	Bois’	point	of	view	highlights	the	extent	to	which	white	working-class	conceptions	of	fair	treatment	depend	on	the	exploitation	of	people	of	color—a	perspective	echoed	by	Bhambra	(2017)	with	her	description	of	the	white	working-class	as	a	group	suffering	a	loss	of	“relative	privilege”	in	the	increasingly	globalized	economy.	This	theoretical	perspective—in	conjunction	with	President	Trump’s	track	record	in	office	as	a	champion	of	the	rich	rather	than	the	working	class	(Manza	&	Crowley,	2017)—challenges	the	notion	that	President	Trump	is	the	populist,	working-class	politician	that	his	campaign	rhetoric	touted	him	as	being.	It	complicates	conventional	understandings	of	who	voted	for	President	Trump:	conversations	on	the	economic	struggles	of	white	working-class	voters	are	insufficient	without	accounting	for	the	material	and	psychological	benefits	they	reap	
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due	to	their	white	identity.	Once	one	considers	the	perspective	that	President	Trump	is	a	politician	who	ultimately	serves	the	needs	of	the	privileged,	then	it	becomes	clear	how	an	investigation	into	non-working	class	Boston	College	Trump	supporters—who	are	part	of	a	student	body	with	more	students	in	the	top	one-percent	of	family	income	than	the	bottom	sixty	percent	(Aisch	et	al.,	2017)—may	help	us	understand	why	President	Trump	got	elected.	In	trying	to	understand	the	narrative	frames	and	discourses	of	my	interviewees,	I	found	literature	on	rational	choice	theory	to	be	most	useful.	Abell	(2000)	provides	a	comprehensive	overview	of	rational	choice	theory,	presenting	it	as	a	theoretical	perspective	that	allows	us	to	see	people	as	individual	actors	behaving	in	ways	that	most	fully	align	with	their	self-interests.	In	analyzing	Trump	supporters,	this	rational	choice	theoretical	perspective	is	certainly	applicable	to	privileged	populations	like	my	interviewee	pool—there	is	tremendous	perceived	incentive	for	those	in	good	economic	standing	to	vote	Republican,	as	policies	of	low	taxes	and	deregulation	are	seemingly	beneficial	for	those	with	access	to	wealth.	For	my	interviewees—especially	those	who	self-identified	as	upper-class—supporting	President	Trump	is	seen	as	the	rational	economic	choice	to	make.	Beyond	rational	choice	theory	as	an	over-arching	theoretical	framework,	other	scholarly	perspectives	were	applicable	to	certain	themes	and	trends	that	arose	out	of	my	interviews.	My	interviewees’	disdain	for	income	taxes	is	consistent	with	Morgan	&	Prasad’s	(2009)	analysis,	which	argues	that	income	taxes	are	met	with	particular	scorn	due	to	their	visibility	(as	opposed	to	the	relative	invisibility	of	consumption	taxes).	Bail	et	al.	(2018)	provide	a	recent	analysis	of	present-day	
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conservatives,	arguing	that	exposure	to	liberal	political	perspectives	leads	to	an	increase	in	conservative	attitudes	amongst	conservatives.	This	could	explain	my	interviewees’	steadfast	conservatism	in	the	face	of	opposing	liberal	influences	on	campus.	Lastly,	for	the	women	whom	I	interviewed	for	this	study,	Schreiber	(2008)	provides	a	relevant	perspective	on	the	importance	of	conservative	women’s	organizations	in	building	networks	of	conservative	women.	Her	work	sheds	light	on	the	successes	and	failures	that	my	woman-identifying	interviewees	have	had	in	building	networks	of	like-minded	women	on	campus.		 Overall,	this	project	draws	from	perspectives	of	critical	race	theorists	and	whiteness	studies	scholars	in	answering	the	question	of	who	voted	for	President	Trump.	Such	perspectives	challenge	white	working-class	tropes	and	legitimize	the	study	of	non-working	class	Trump	supporters	in	efforts	to	understand	why	President	Trump	was	elected.	In	terms	of	uncovering	narrative	frames	and	discourses	from	my	interviews,	rational	choice	theory	and	other	scholarly	perspectives	are	useful	towards	understanding	the	points	of	view	of	my	interviewees.							
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METHODS			 Through	my	conversations	with	Trump	supporters	at	Boston	College,	interviewees	varied	in	the	kinds	of	issues	they	talked	about	and	the	degree	to	which	they	were	passionate	or	knowledgeable	about	their	own	positions.	Despite	these	variations,	the	interviewees	were	united	in	the	fact	that	they	all	self-identified	as	Trump	supporters	and	none	self-identified	as	working-class.	My	goal	with	the	interviews	was	to	delve	deep	into	the	various	individual	perspectives	of	my	interviewees,	and	to	emerge	from	that	deep	dive	with	certain	narrative	frames	and	discourses	that	were	common	amongst	the	interviewees.		 Organizing	such	a	large	amount	of	data—I	conducted	over	sixteen	and	a	half	hours	of	interviews,	in	total—into	a	finite	amount	of	narrative	frames	is	a	challenging	task,	but	necessary	towards	understanding	if	there	is	any	larger	story	that	can	be	told	from	the	data.	Arlie	Hochschild’s	2016	book,	“Strangers	in	Their	Own	Land,”	serves	as	a	methodological	guide	on	how	to	compare	and	synthesize	these	kinds	of	interviews.		 Hochschild	(2016)	immersed	herself	in	communities	of	Tea	Party	supporters	and	activists	in	Louisiana,	looking	for	what	she	calls	the	“deep	story”	of	what	is	happening	on	the	right.	She	wanted	to	go	deeper	than	surface	level	analyses	of	Tea	Partiers	as	low-tax,	anti-government	libertarians.	In	doing	so,	she	argues	that	she	uncovered	a	“deep	story”	of	a	group	of	people	that	feels	“left	behind.”	This	“deep	story”	can	be	explained	by	the	common	narratives	that	Hochschild	gathered	from	her	interviews:	the	idea	that	people—largely	people	of	color—are	“Line	Cutters,”	circumventing	the	white	working-class	that	has	been	“Waiting	in	Line”	for	
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generations;	the	feeling	of	“Betrayal”	that	interviewees	felt	towards	the	bureaucrats	who	allowed	for	such	line	cutting;	the	“Intermission”	of	the	American	dream	due	to	automation,	offshoring,	and	the	power	of	multinational	corporations;	generally,	the	race,	gender,	and	class	considerations	of	a	predominantly	white,	male,	non-upper	class	group	who	feels	they	have	been	cheated	on	the	basis	of	their	identity.		 This	project	employs	narrative	frames	in	a	similar	fashion.	Through	my	interviews,	I	found	that	interviewees	repeatedly	shared	certain	positions	or	narratives	on	topics	related	to	hard	work,	identity,	and	community.	Taking	note	of	these	narratives	is	key,	as	they	show	that	there	is—to	an	extent—a	common	experience	of	being	a	Trump	supporter	at	Boston	College.	More	broadly,	the	existence	of	these	common	narratives	serves	to	justify	the	sociological	study	of	non-working	class	Trump	supporters	as	a	group,	much	in	the	same	way	that	Hochschild’s	(2016)	book	serves	to	justify	the	study	of	white	working-class	Trump	supporters	as	a	group.		 I	recruited	my	interviewees	by	reaching	out	to	the	president	of	the	leading	conservative	student	organization	on	campus,	College	Republicans,	via	email.	My	invitation	to	participate	was	then	forwarded	to	all	members	of	the	club.	All	sixteen	of	my	interviewees	were	reached	through	that	College	Republicans	email.	As	a	result,	it	is	very	possible	that	my	sample	does	not	encapsulate	the	entire	Trump-supporting	population	at	Boston	College.		 Interviews	were	semi-structured	and	conducted	one-on-one,	either	in	reserved	classrooms	or	reserved	study	rooms	inside	O’Neill	Library	on	campus.	All	interviewees	read	and	signed	informed	consent	documents,	which	included	consent	
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for	me	to	record	the	interviews	on	my	phone.	The	recorded	interviews	were	then	transcribed	and	coded	in	order	to	find	certain	themes	and	trends	in	the	interview	data.	All	interviewees	were	compensated	with	a	$30	Amazon	gift	card	through	self-funding.																				
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Below	is	a	table	outlining	the	identity	markers	for	my	interviewees:	
	 Race	 Gender	 Sex.	Orient.	 BC	Class	 Major	 Social	Class	 Hometown	
Int.	1	 White	 Man	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 PoliSci	 Upper-Middle	 South	Boston	(urban)	
Int.	2	 White	 Man	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 Finance	&	Physics	 Upper	 Grafton,	MA	(suburb)	
Int.	3	 White	&	Asian	 Man	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 Econ	 Middle	 New	Jersey	(urban)	
Int.	4	 White	 Man	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Econ	 Upper	 Atlanta	(suburb)	
Int.	5	 White	 Man	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 PoliSci	 Lower-Middle	 Mendon,	MA	(suburb)	
Int.	6	
White	Hispanic	(Spanish)	 Woman	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 CompSci	 Upper	 Switzerland	
Int.	7	 White	 Man	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Finance	 Upper-Middle	 Atlanta	(suburb)	
Int.	8	 White	 Woman	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Nursing	 Upper	 MA	suburb	(unspecified)	
Int.	9	 Asian	(Chinese)	 Man	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Econ	&	Math	 Middle	 MA	suburb	(unspecified)	
Int.	10	
White	Hispanic	(Cuban)	 Man	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 PoliSci	 Middle	
Hialeah,	FL	(suburb)			
Int.	11	 Hispanic	(Cuban)	 Woman	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 English	 Middle	 Rockland	County,	NY	(suburb)	
Int.	12	 White	 Woman	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Neuroscience	&	Linguistics	 Upper-Middle	 Research	Triangle	Park,	NC	(suburb)	
Int.	13	 White	 Woman	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Psychology	 Upper	 East	Bay,	CA	(suburb)	
Int.	14	
Asian-American	(Filipino)	 Man	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 History	+	PoliSci	 Upper-Middle	 Northern	New	Jersey	(suburb)	
Int.	15	 White	 Woman	 Hetero.	 Sophomore	 History	+	PoliSci	 Upper-Middle	 Southwest	Florida	(suburb)	
Int.	16	 White	 Man	 Hetero.	 Freshman	 Secondary	Education	+	History	 Upper-Middle	 Western	MA	(suburb)		
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1.	“What’s	good	for	me	is	what’s	good	for	all”		 To	an	extent,	we	all	have	biases	that	stem	from	our	own	personal	experiences.	My	interviewees	were	no	different.	When	speaking	on	the	economy,	as	a	whole,	the	interviewees	would	naturally	draw	from	their	own	experiences.	Given	the	relatively	young	age	of	the	sample,	these	personal	experiences	with	the	economy	were	more	often	than	not	through	their	parents.	Whether	they	were	business	executives	or	real	estate	developers,	the	parents	of	my	interviewees	would	offer	their	views	on	taxes,	welfare,	and	other	economic	issues.	Interviewees	were	quick	to	jump	from	the	personal	to	the	collective—they	would	see	how	their	own	families	fared	under	certain	economic	policies	and	draw	conclusions	on	the	economy	as	a	whole	from	their	own	perspective.	Obviously,	all	economic	policies	do	not	affect	all	families	in	the	same	way.	Take	Interviewee	#12,	for	example.	A	white	woman	who	self-identifies	as	upper-middle	class,	Interviewee	#12	grew	up	in	the	business	and	technology	hub	of	Research	Triangle	Park,	North	Carolina	(RTP).	A	suburb	of	Raleigh,	RTP	is	an	area	that	is	economically	thriving—“very	much	business	and	technology	area…	fast	growing	suburbs	kind	of	thing”	(Interviewee	#12).		 Interviewee	#12’s	family	is	fortunate	enough	to	be	a	part	of	this	economic	growth	in	the	area.	She	describes	her	father	as	“an	international	businessman	for	IBM…	very	much	business-y…	white	collar.”	Simply	put,	when	Interviewee	#12	sees	news	profiles	on	working-class,	blue-collar	Trump	supporters,	she	does	not	see	herself	or	her	family	in	those	stories:		
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Yeah,	not	at	all.	It	seems	very	foreign	almost.	Like,	I	don’t	know	any	
steelworkers	or	anyone,	like,	from	the	Midwest…	It	doesn’t	seem	to	represent	
any	of	the	Trump	supporters	I	knew.			 So,	who	were	the	Trump	supporters	that	Interviewee	#12	knew	growing	up,	if	she	was	not	living	in	a	deindustrialized,	blue-collar,	Midwest	town?	Her	upbringing	in	an	area	of	economically	successful	professionals	is	far	different	from	what	one	may	expect	of	a	Trump	supporter	if	one	is	under	the	assumption	that	Trump	is	a	working-class	hero.		 At	the	beginning	of	our	conversation,	I	was	unsure	how	exactly	Interviewee	#12	found	herself	to	be	a	Trump	supporter:	she	described	her	area	as	“a	very	blue	area	of	North	Carolina”;	her	friends	around	the	time	of	the	2016	Election	were	“very,	very	liberal	and	open	about	it”;	in	her	words,	“everyone	likes	Hillary	and	no	one	likes	Trump	is	kind	of	the	idea	around	me.”	When	I	asked	her	about	her	family,	though,	it	became	clear	how	Interviewee	#12	could	become	a	conservative	in	an	area	that	is	apparently	so	liberal.		 Except	for	her	older	sister,	Interviewee	#12’s	family	of	six	is	“all	pretty	conservative.”	Growing	up,	Interviewee	#12	claims	that	she	would	not	talk	much	about	politics	with	friends	or	at	high	school—rather,	most	of	her	political	discourse	took	place	at	the	dinner	table.	She	vividly	recalled	certain	dinner	table	debates	between	her	older	sister	and	her	father	that	ultimately	solidified	her	conservative	viewpoint.	After	seeing	her	father	and	her	sister	debate	on	topics	like	gun	control,	
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unions	and	the	gender	wage	gap,	“[my	father’s]	perspective	in	the	business	world	seemed	to	make	more	sense	to	me.”		 I	was	intrigued	to	learn	more	about	Interviewee	#12’s	family	situation.	I	learned	that	the	main	difference	between	her	non-conservative	older	sister	and	the	rest	of	the	conservative	family	was	the	path	of	schooling	each	child	underwent:	while	her	older	sister	went	to	public	middle	school	and	a	college	preparatory	high	school,	Interviewee	#12	and	the	rest	of	the	family	went	to	Catholic	middle	school	before	going	onto	public	high	school.	Interviewee	#12	described	her	Catholic	middle	school	as	a	homogenous,	conservative	environment:		
It	was	a	Catholic	middle	school,	so	everyone’s	parents	were	pretty	much	all,	
like,	conservative	Republicans.	So	the	kids	didn’t	really	seem	to	hear	other	ideas	
and	then	wanna	learn	and	conflict	those	ideas…	It	was,	like,	kind	of	almost	an	
echo	chamber	in	a	way.	
	Unlike	her	non-conservative	sister,	Interviewee	#12	rarely	clashed	with	her	father.	As	such,	she	viewed	her	father	as	a	trusted	source	on	everything	politics—a	successful	businessman	with	the	kind	of	life	experience	and	perspective	that	should	be	respected.	So,	when	the	government	would	put	forth	certain	economic	policies,	Interviewee	#12	would	look	to	her	father	when	deciding	whether	or	not	the	policy	should	be	supported:		
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I	have	seen	how	the	tax	cuts	helped	my	family	get	a	bonus.	I	know	they've	
helped,	like,	several	others.	From	the	way	my	dad	explained	it	to	me,	the	tax	
cuts	allow	them	to,	like,	you	know,	give	back	to	the	employees	a	little	bit	and	
further	increase	the	business	by	having	more	incentives	for	employees	to	work	
harder.			 As	a	businessman,	Interviewee	#12’s	father’s	relationship	with	taxes	is	far	different	than,	say,	a	service	worker’s	relationship	with	taxes.	For	Interviewee	#12’s	father,	ramifications	of	tax	policy	are	immediately	considered	from	an	employer’s	perspective:	lower	taxes	means	more	money	in	the	employer’s	pocket,	giving	the	employer	more	freedom	to	distribute	to	his	employees	without	government	intervention.	It	is	easy	to	see	how	low	taxes	would	be	enticing	for	an	employer.	Not	only	is	less	money	being	taken	by	the	government—the	newfound	money	that	would	have	previously	been	taxed	can	now	be	distributed	to	employees	on	an	incentive	basis	and	presumably	increase	productivity	for	the	entire	business.		 If	one	is	only	told	this	perspective	on	taxes,	how	can	we	expect	one	to	support	anything	but	the	lowest	tax	plan	possible?	This	is	the	position	from	which	Interviewee	#12	operates.	Sure,	she	could	have	had	plenty	of	non-conservative	friends	in	high	school,	but	when	most	of	her	meaningful	political	conversation	occurs	at	the	dinner	table	with	conservative	family	members	and	her	Catholic	middle	school	was	a	self-described	conservative	“echo	chamber,”	it	is	understandable	why	Interviewee	#12	would	support	conservative	politics	without	much	thought	to	perspectives	different	from	hers.	
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	 Interviewee	#12	was	not	the	only	interviewee	with	a	conservative,	economically	successful	(or	at	least	economically	secure)	father.	I	was	very	much	interested	in	this	parental	influence—how	parents,	especially	fathers,	helped	shape	the	interviewees	understanding	of	what	is	good	for	them,	and	how	that	understanding	affected	their	view	on	what	is	good	for	us	all.		 Like	Interviewee	#12,	Interviewee	#8	was	a	white	woman	with	a	conservative	father.	Growing	up	in	the	Massachusetts	suburbs,	Interviewee	#8	self-identifies	as	upper-class—she	mentioned	how	she	went	to	private	school	all	of	her	life	and	has	funds	set	aside	for	her	by	her	grandfather.	Given	her	openness	and	honesty	about	her	class	position,	it	was	refreshing	to	talk	to	Interviewee	#8.	She	was	willing	to	share	a	lot	about	her	experience	as	an	upper-class	Trump	supporter	and	serves	as	a	great	example	of	how	Trump’s	appeal	to	the	upper-class	can	be	just	as	strong	as	his	appeal	to	the	working-class.		 When	talking	to	Interviewee	#8	about	her	support	for	Trump,	opposing	forces	of	family	and	school	were	immediately	brought	to	the	forefront	(as	they	were	for	Interviewee	#12).	From	pre-K	through	eighth	grade,	Interviewee	#8	had	attended	an	elite,	high-tuition	(north	of	$30,000)	private	all-girls	school	just	southwest	of	Boston.	From	there,	she	attended	an	elite,	college	preparatory	high	school	south	of	Boston	with	a	much	different	culture:		 So	that	was	kind	of	hard	for	me	going	from	like	all	girls	school	where	most	
people	are	like	Christian	and	like	pretty	conservative	and	then	going	to	[high	
school]	where	you	have	kids	from	all	around	the	world.	
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		 For	Interviewee	#8,	her	experience	at	a	more	liberal	high	school	did	not	shift	her	politics	to	the	left.	In	fact,	the	proudly	left-wing	environment—for	example,	Interviewee	#8	claims	that	students	were	passing	out	pro-Hillary	stickers	at	recess	with	slogans	from	her	campaign—left	Interviewee	#8	“hoping	for	Trump	to	win.”		 Despite	her	qualms	with	life	at	her	high	school,	Interviewee	#8	did	find	solace	in	her	home	life.	She	describes	her	home	growing	up	as	a	“really	Catholic	household”:	they	went	to	Church	every	Sunday;	she	was	raised	reading	the	Bible	and	going	to	youth	group;	her	community	at	Church	was	central	to	her	upbringing.	As	was	the	case	with	many	other	interviewees,	this	heavily	religious	background	informed	Interviewee	#8’s	conservatism.	In	her	case,	the	connection	between	Catholicism	and	conservative	politics	was	found	in	the	issue	of	abortion.	She	mentioned	how	she	is	passionately	pro-life	because	her	father,	who	was	adopted:	
	
My	dad	like	told	me	a	lot	about	Roe	v.	Wade	when	I	was	younger.	But	I	didn’t	
really	listen	and	then	I	looked	it	up	in	high	school	and	learned	that	my	dad	was	
born	in	’62	and	Roe	v	Wade	was	in	’73.	So	my	dad	always	tells	me,	like,	“I	don’t	
know	if	I	would	be	here	if	I’d	been	born	ten	years	later.”	So,	things	like	that	and	
just	the	way	I	was	like	raised	in	like	reading	the	Bible…	I	think	that’s	like	how	I	
got	my	pro-life	stance.			 The	influence	from	her	father	in	determining	what	is	or	is	not	good	for	society	went	beyond	the	issue	of	abortion.	Both	her	father	and	her	grandfather	work	
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in	real	estate	development.	As	such,	Interviewee	#8’s	views	on	a	variety	of	issues	come	down	to	whether	or	not	the	policy	is	good	for	business.	This	perspective	differed	from	her	more	left-wing	peers	in	high	school.	She	mentioned	how	her	classmates	were	outspoken	in	their	opposition	to	conservatism	and	how	protests	were	common	on	her	high	school	campus—and	they	were	not	protesting	for	tax	cuts	and	deregulation:		
So	like	I	was	friends	with	a	lot	of	people	who	had	socialist	ideas	or	like	they	
read	a	lot	of	like	Karl	Marx	or	sort	of	more	progressive	ideals	about	finance	and	
things	like	that.	And	I	was	thinking	about	sort	of	in	relation	to	like	my	
grandfather	and	my	dad	who	were	both	like	in	real	estate	development.	I	would	
talk	to	them	a	lot	about	what	they	thought	about	it	and	they	would	say	that	
they	were	always	pro	low	corporate	tax	rates	that	would	help	their	company	
prosper	so	they	could	hire	more	people.		 		 Just	like	Interviewee	#12,	Interviewee	#8’s	father	looks	at	taxes	from	the	perspective	of	the	employer:	lower	taxes	gives	the	employer	more	freedom	to	do	with	their	money	as	they	please.	Working	from	this	perspective	assumes	that	all	tax	policy	should	be	geared	towards	what	is	best	for	the	employer,	not	the	employee.	Growing	up	with	parents	who	are	employers	(or,	at	least,	highly-paid	employees)	can	certainly	affect	one’s	view	on	what	is	best	for	tax	policy.	
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	 This	business-friendly	perspective	not	only	influences	one’s	view	on	taxes,	but	other	issues	as	well.	For	Interviewee	#8,	convenience	for	businesses	and	business	owners	was	top	priority,	even	in	the	case	of	the	environment:		
[My	father]	has	a	lot	of	like	stories	from	his	own	experience	working	in	real	
estate	development	that	he	shares	with	me.	One	that	I	can	remember	off	the	top	
of	my	head	is	like	he	was	building	something	around	this	area	and	there	was	a	
letter	that	he	got	from	an	environmentalist	foundation,	something	like	that,	
and	he	couldn't	build	on	the	land	because	there	was	like	a	specific	species	of	
rabbit	or	like	some	like	crazy	thing.	And	he	like	was	really	mad	about	it	so	he	
told	me.	And	I	remember	when	he	told	me	when	I	was	like	ten	and	I	didn't	
really	think	about	it.	And	then	like	when	I	was	like	16	in	high	school,	I	was	like,	
"Oh	my	gosh,	I	remember	my	dad	was	like	really	mad	one	time	because	he	like	
couldn't	build	on	this	land	because	there	was	like	a	rabbit	or	maybe	it	was	a	
turtle	or	something	like	crazy."		In	this	scenario,	Interviewee	#8	was	only	ten	years	old,	so	she	was	almost	certainly	not	equipped	with	the	knowledge	or	articulation	skills	to	refute	her	father	in	this	situation.	We	should	not	expect	ten	year	olds	to	have	the	ability	to	defend	necessary	environmental	regulations	to	businessmen	who	are	looking	to	turn	the	highest	profit.	From	Interviewee	#8’s	ten	year	old	perspective,	she	was	most	likely	viewing	her	dad’s	word	as	the	absolute	truth,	as	most	ten	year	olds	do.	
	 23	
Unfortunately,	this	kind	of	fatherly	advice	has	a	distinct	political	undertone,	and	this	undertone	undoubtedly	has	an	influence	on	the	children	that	are	being	raised.	These	kinds	of	subtle	forms	of	influence	from	parents	on	what	is	or	is	not	good	for	society	were	quite	common	in	my	interviews.	Due	to	their	subtlety,	many	interviewees	were	uncomfortable	in	saying	that	they	were	completely	influenced	by	their	parents.	Sure,	they	conceded	slightly	that	their	parents	were	an	influencing	factor,	but	interviewees	constantly	reiterated	that	their	views	were	their	own.	Interviewee	#8	was	no	different:	
	
And	even	though	I	did	get	a	little	influence	from	like	my	dad,	because	he's	really	
conservative,	I	always	sort	of	had	my	own	like	skepticism	about	it.	But	then	
going	through	high	school,	everything	was	sort	of	reaffirmed	what	my	dad	had	
been	telling	me	just	from	like	my	own	experience	there,	I	would	say.	Pretty	
much…	I	would	agree	with	most	of	what	he	like	thinks	about	issues.			 Like	Interviewee	#12	and	Interviewee	#8,	Interviewee	#2	grew	up	in	a	conservative	household.	Hailing	from	Grafton	(a	central	Massachusetts	suburb),	Interviewee	#2	has	many	conservative	influences	in	his	family	life:	his	father	works	in	banking	as	a	senior	manager	and	is	a	big	proponent	of	free,	unregulated	markets;	his	mother	is	a	“super	hard	right	conservative”	with	a	big	personality	and	strong	views;	many	of	Interviewee	#2’s	cousins	and	family	members	were	in	the	military	and	hold	strong	views	on	national	security.	Like	my	other	interviewees,	Interviewee	#2	did	not	perceive	the	similarities	between	him	and	his	parents’	political	
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perspectives	as	a	result	of	deliberate	influence.	Beyond	his	parents’	detesting	of	Barack	Obama’s	proposed	economic	regulations	in	the	2008,	Interviewee	#2	feels	that	they	“didn’t	really	force	things”	on	him.		 Regardless	of	perceived	parental	influence,	similarities	between	Interviewee	#2’s	perspective	and	the	perspectives	of	his	parents	(especially	his	father)	are	hard	to	ignore.	When	I	asked	Interviewee	#2	to	talk	about	the	issues	that	are	most	important	to	him,	he	immediately	brought	up	his	father:	
	
Yeah	probably	the	economy,	I	guess	that’s	where	my	upbringing’s	from,	like	my	
dad.	My	top	priority	is	economic	growth—retaining	your	wealth	as	a	person.	
Second	to	that,	I	guess	it	was	like	a	lot	of	things	that	can	pertain	to	that,	
because	once	you	bring	up	wealth	then	you	can	say	like	“Oh,	how	do	taxes	affect	
your	wealth?”	Then	it’s,	like,	“What	affects	taxes?”	You	can	say,	like,	“All	these	
social	programs	will	affect	your	taxes,	because	the	government	has	to	pay	for	
them.”	So	it	pretty	much	brings	in	literally	everything.	I	guess	the	overarching	
issue	is	the	economy	and	keeping	personal	wealth	for	me,	specifically.			 Out	of	all	of	my	interviewees,	Interviewee	#2	was	perhaps	most	explicit	in	his	belief	that	what	is	good	for	him	is	good	for	all.	As	he	says	above,	his	measurement	for	what	makes	sound	tax	policy	is	not	complex:	for	Interviewee	#2,	efficacy	of	tax	policy	is	determined	by	the	extent	to	which	that	policy	detracts	from	his	personal	wealth,	not	the	value	of	the	social	programs	that	the	taxes	fund.	When	it	comes	to	measuring	economic	growth,	Interviewee	#2’s	insistence	on	retaining	personal	wealth	does	not	waver:	
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Honestly,	I	don’t	really	care	about	any	specific	economic	structure.	I	just	pretty	
much	care	about—I	guess,	like,	the	American	economy	as	a	whole.	Whatever	
pretty	much	drives	company’s	earnings,	in	my	opinion,	will	help	me,	because	
that	ties	into	keeping	personal	wealth.	As	long	as	the	overall	stock	market—
which	is	not	the	economy,	it’s	like	a	different	thing—but,	as	long	as	that	keeps	
going	up,	I’m	happy	as	a	person.	That’s	just	my	opinion.			 For	Interviewee	#2,	personal	wealth	retention	is	of	upmost	importance,	even	when	his	personal	wealth	interests	go	against	the	mission—or,	at	least,	the	rhetoric—of	the	Trump	administration.	When	I	asked	Interviewee	#2	about	his	thoughts	on	an	“America-first”	economy	(one	of	the	foundational	messages	of	the	Trump	campaign),	his	support—in	his	own	words—was	“wishy-washy”:		
I	want	jobs	to	be	here	as	opposed	to	overseas.	But	at	the	same	time,	it’s	just:	will	
them	bringing	the	jobs	back	here	make	my	personal	wealth	decrease?	It’s	kind	
of	selfish,	but	at	the	same	time,	you	just	gotta	balance	it	between	yourself	and	
others.		A	sophomore	finance	student,	Interviewee	#2,	in	many	ways,	is	an	embodiment	of	the	central	tenets	of	classical	economic	theory.	He	is	an	unabashed	supporter	of	wealth	accumulation—of	acting	in	his	own	self-interest.	His	views	on	all	aspects	of	the	economy—from	growth	to	taxes	to	the	job	market—are	all	
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measured	in	terms	of	how	they	will	affect	his	personal	accumulation	of	wealth.	In	classical	economic	terms,	one	can	argue	that	Interviewee	#2	is	acting	exactly	how	he	should	be:	his	pursuit	of	rational	self-interest	is	the	kind	of	behavior	required	of	people	in	a	capitalist	economy.	People	like	Interviewee	#2	put	Adam	Smith’s	“invisible	hand”	in	motion.	In	talking	about	taxes,	Interviewee	#2	and	other	interviewees	simply	elided	debates	on	how	taxes	can	contribute	to	the	greater	good.	To	my	interviewees,	distrust	in	government	was	often	too	high	to	even	consider	the	social	benefits	of	taxation.	This	disdain	for	taxes	echoes	what	Morgan	&	Prasad	(2009)	found	in	their	comparative	analysis	of	tax	systems	in	the	United	States	and	France.	They	found	that	the	kind	of	direct	taxation	in	the	United	States	(such	as	income	tax)	is	treated	with	far	more	animosity	than	the	kind	of	indirect	taxation	has	been	instituted	in	France	since	World	War	I	(such	as	consumption	tax).	The	main	difference	between	direct	and	indirect	taxes	is	visibility:	while	the	former	is	quite	visible	and	explicit	in	the	eyes	of	taxpayers,	the	latter	is	not.	Perhaps	my	interviewees	would	not	be	so	vehemently	against	taxation	if	the	United	States	instituted	a	France-like	system	of	indirect	taxation.	When	trying	to	understand	the	role	of	self-interest	amongst	Trump	supporters,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	self-interest	not	as	a	concrete	fact,	but	as	a	learned	perspective.	Nearly	all	of	my	interviewees	grew	up	with	parents,	in	households,	or	in	communities	that	supported	conservative	political	thought;	more	so,	many	of	my	interviewees	grew	up	in	these	conservative	environments	while	enjoying	a	relative	amount	of	economic	privilege.	Thus,	it	should	not	be	surprising	
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that	my	interviewees	have	come	to	understand	self-interest	in	terms	of	deregulation,	low	taxes,	and	personal	wealth	accumulation,	and	that	my	interviewees	associate	pursuit	of	that	self-interest	with	pursuit	of	the	collective	interest.	This	pursuit	of	self-interest	is	at	the	heart	of	the	“what’s	good	for	me	is	what’s	good	for	all”	mentality.	Though	Interviewee	#2	may	have	been	most	explicit,	self-interest—whether	deliberately	or	not—ultimately	determined	the	economic	perspectives	of	Interviewee	#12,	Interviewee	#8,	and	many	of	the	other	Trump	supporters	I	interviewed	for	this	study.	
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2.	“I	overcame	the	struggle,	and	so	can	you”	Meritocratic	principles	are	at	the	heart	of	American	conservative	ideology.	The	conservative	ideal	states	that	it	is	up	to	the	individual	to	work	hard	and	achieve	success,	and	it	is	often	justified	by	arguing	that	everyone	has	an	opportunity	to	succeed.	This	importance	of	hard	work	was	reiterated	constantly	by	my	interviewees—its	purpose	is	twofold:	both	to	justify	the	personal	privilege	and	success	of	the	interviewees	(especially	those	who	identified	as	upper	or	upper-middle	class),	as	well	as	to	justify	the	struggles	that	other	Americans	are	going	through.	In	response	to	the	plight	of	impoverished	communities	and	undocumented	immigrants,	the	sentiment	I	gained	from	my	interviewees	was	clear:	I	overcame	the	struggle,	and	so	can	you.	From	stories	of	their	own	family’s	immigration	to	America	to	stories	of	the	hard	work	put	in	by	interviewees	and	their	parents,	interviewees	often	cited	their	own	personal	struggles	(which	they	overcame	through	hard	work)	as	justification	for	the	struggles	of	others	(which	others	can	overcome	if	they	work	hard	enough).	Many	of	my	interviewees	had	a	great	deal	of	pride	for	the	places	they	came	from	and	the	families	that	raised	them.	Interviewee	#10	was	certainly	no	different.	A	sophomore	studying	political	science,	Interviewee	#10	was	able	to	clearly	articulate	the	connections	between	his	political	perspective	and	personal	background.	Growing	up	in	Hialeah,	Florida—“a	suburb	next	to	Miami,”	in	his	words—Interviewee	#10	was	raised	in	a	community	of	Cuban	immigrants	just	like	his	family	(he	says	that	his	hometown	is	“like	90-something	percent”	Cuban	immigrants).	
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Hialeah	is	a	great	example	of	the	kind	of	community	to	which	Trump	was	trying	to	appeal	with	his	“America	first”	campaign	rhetoric.	Interviewee	#10	described	Hialeah	as	a	divided	area:	west	of	Palm	Avenue,	one	can	find	new	stores,	shopping	centers,	and	restaurants;	in	the	east,	empty	warehouses	(former	factories)	are	scattered	throughout,	many	of	which	are	now	being	used	for	storage.	These	empty	warehouses	are	places	where	Interviewee	#10’s	grandparents	used	to	work;	they	were	the	first	jobs	they	had	upon	immigrating	to	America	from	Cuba.	To	Interviewee	#10,	the	empty	warehouses	symbolize	the	kind	of	economic	opportunity	once	afforded	to	Americans	that	is	no	longer	available	today	due	to	companies	moving	jobs	overseas.	He	mentions	how	the	Trump	campaign	spoke	directly	to	this	concern:		
What	Trump	was	saying,	my	dad	had	been	saying	for,	like,	since	I	can	
remember.	Like,	we	need	to	bring	businesses	back.		In	addition	to	Trump’s	“America	first”	rhetoric,	Trump’s	stance	on	immigration	really	resonated	with	Interviewee	#10.	He	was	more	than	willing	to	share	his	family’s	story	of	coming	to	America	decades	ago.	As	he	tells	it,	it	took	his	dad	ten	years	of	“waiting	in	line”	to	get	out	of	Cuba—Interviewee	#10’s	grandparents	decided	that	they	were	going	to	leave	Cuba	when	his	father	was	four	years	old,	but	they	did	not	get	to	actually	do	so	until	he	was	fourteen.	When	Interviewee	#10	hears	about	people	coming	into	this	country	undocumented,	he	
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feels	disrespected,	thinking	that	they	are	skipping	the	“line”	that	his	father	and	grandparents	waited	in	for	so	long:	
	
But	what	I'm	very	strongly	against	is	illegal	immigration,	and	this	is	also	part	
of	the	way	that	my	parents	got	here.	It	took	my	dad	10	years	to	get	into	the	U.S.	
…	My	father's	a	single	child	because	it	would	have	been	harder	for	my	
grandparents	to	leave	the	island	with	two	kids,	than	it	would	have	been	to	
leave	with	one.	So,	you	know,	it	took	him—he	was	14	when	he	left.	So,	basically	
around	10	years	is	what	it	took	him	to	get	out	of	the	island…	It's	very	unfair	for	
people	who	waited,	and	who	stood	in	line,	and	who	had	to	put	up	with	just	the	
same	amount	of	hardships	as	anyone	else—for	them	to	have	waited	all	this	
time	and	then	for	someone	to	waltz	into	the	border.			 Interviewee	#10	is	quite	proud	of	his	family’s	journey	from	Cuba	to	America.	Throughout	our	conversation,	he	mentioned	the	influence	that	his	father	had	on	him	growing	up.	Specifically,	Interviewee	#10	would	talk	at	length	about	the	values	of	hard	work	and	determination	that	he	says	his	father	instilled	in	him.	To	Interviewee	#10,	these	values	of	hard	work	and	determination	are	inextricable	from	his	Cuban	heritage.	He	recalled	one	conversation	he	had	with	his	dad	when	he	was	fourteen	or	fifteen:		
We	know	what	we	have	to	do,	we	have	to	work.	And	that's	something	that's	
been	passed	down	to	my	brothers	and	I,	you	know.	There	was	one	summer	that	
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I	was	making	plans	of	all	I'm	going	to	do	this	summer,	and	I'm	gonna	have	so	
much	fun	or	whatever.	And	my	dad	looked	at	me	and	very	coldly	he	told	me,	
"You're	not	doing	any	of	that	this	summer.	You're	gonna	get	on	the	truck	with	
me."	And	my	dad	sells	vegetables	to	restaurants.	And	he	told	me,	"You're	going	
to	get	in	the	truck	with	me	and	we're	going	to	go	out	and	you're	going	to	learn	
what	it’s	like	...	and	that	summer	was	pretty,	pretty	life	changing…	[My	dad]	
told	me,	“You	need	to	learn	what	it's	like	to	work.	You	need	to	see	at	least	a	
similar	version	of	what	I	saw	when	I	got	here.”	Because	when	he	got	here,	my	
dad	couldn't—my	dad	graduated	high	school,	but	he	couldn't	go	to	college	or	
anything.			 These	connections	between	immigrant	backgrounds	and	the	value	of	hard	work	were	quite	common	in	my	interviews.	Like	Interviewee	#10,	Interviewee	#14	was	a	political	science	student	who	frequently	made	connections	between	his	political	perspective	and	personal	background.	A	sophomore	from	the	suburbs	of	northern	New	Jersey,	Interviewee	#14	talked	at	length	about	his	Filipino	heritage	and	the	process	his	parents	had	to	go	through	in	order	to	come	to	America	in	the	early	1990s.	One	of	the	struggles	his	parents	had	to	go	through	was	shedding	their	Filipino	culture	for	American	culture.	Interviewee	#14	perceives	this	culture-shedding	process	as	tough,	but	necessary,	and	he	takes	issue	with	immigrants	who	are	hesitant	to	fully	adapt	to	what	he	considers	is	American	culture:		
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My	big	issue	is	just	this	notion	that	illegal	immigrants	and	immigrants	that	
don't	have	the	proper	papers	come	here	to	work	and	live,	because	I	think	it	does	
a	disservice	to	my	own	parents,	who've	had	to	go	through	all	of	that	trial,	you	
know,	that	trouble	to	get	here	to	the	United	States	to	work.	…	But	because	they	
had	to	go	through	the	proper	way,	like,	they	had	to	come	here,	and	they	had	to	
learn.	And	they	had	to	adapt	to	the	culture	and	they	had	to	adapt	to	American	
culture,	they	had	to	speak	English,	they	had	to	kind	of	adapt	their	own	culture	
to	an	American	culture.	…	It	should	not	be	the	other	way	around,	where	I'm	
supposed	to	learn	Spanish	for	you,	because	you	don't	understand	English.	
That's	again,	you	know,	it's	because	you're	going	here	in	the	United	States	to	
better	yourself,	there's	also	a	trade-off,	you	need	to	adapt	to	the	culture.	You	
need	to	adapt	to	the	language.			 Interviewee	#14	not	only	had	his	parents’	experiences	to	draw	on.	He	also	talked	at	length	about	the	long	process	his	uncle	had	to	go	through	in	order	to	come	to	America.	He	shared	that	his	mother	petitioned	to	get	her	younger	brother	into	the	United	States	in	2000	before	he	finally	got	his	visa	in	2013.	Since	marriage	forces	one	to	reapply	in	the	immigration	process,	Interviewee	#14’s	uncle—a	man	with	strong	Catholic	values—had	a	child	out	of	wedlock	with	his	then-girlfriend	(now	wife).	Interviewee	#14’s	uncle	is	now	happily	married	and	living	in	Texas	with	his	family,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	Interviewee	#14	forgets	his	uncle’s	journey:		
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It	was	a	process	and	they	had	to	sacrifice	for	that,	and	it	wasn't	easy.	And	I	feel	
like	it's	an	injustice	to	people	like	them	if	you	just	allow,	you	know,	people	who	
didn't	have	to	go	through	that	process	to	come	here	illegally	and	to	benefit	in	
certain	ways	that	Americans	benefit.			 What	Interviewee	#14	ultimately	gathers	from	the	immigrant	experiences	of	his	family	members	is	the	importance	of	hard	work.	More	than	that,	Interviewee	#14—much	like	Interviewee	#10—projects	his	family’s	experiences	onto	the	experiences	of	other	Americans;	if	his	parents	were	able	to	work	their	way	up	in	this	country	through	hard	work,	then	so	can	others:		
I	think	it's	important	that	I	feel	grateful	because	[my	parents]	worked	their	
way	up—it	wasn't	a	mere	just	stumble	in	and	now	you're	lucky,	and	now	you	
have	all	that	you	got.	Like,	no.	They	had	to	work	their	way,	and	I	think	the	issue	
with	liberals,	a	lot	of	times	I	feel	like	they	underestimate	how	hard	work	can	
actually	pay	off.	You	know,	a	lot	of	times	they're	blaming	external	things,	a	lot	
of	times	they're	blaming,	you	know,	the	structure	of	our	economy	that's	not	
letting	for	social	mobility.	I	hear	that	all	the	time…	But	I	feel	like	they	
underestimate	like	the	power	of	I	guess,	like,	perseverance,	hard	work,	you	
know,	trying	to	get	an	education.	Again,	that's	how	I	view	my	time	here	at	BC.	
You	know,	like,	working	hard	and	trying	to	get	the	education,	because	that's	
what	my	parents	have	worked	their	life,	just	for	them	to	be	in	the	United	States.	
	 34	
And	now	I'm	getting	an	education	here,	at	a	very	good	school,	it's	my	duty	to	
continue	that	and	to	try	my	best.			 Emphasis	on	the	importance	of	hard	work	was	not	unique	to	solely	interviewees	who	identified	strongly	with	their	immigrant	background.	Nearly	all	of	my	interviewees	talked	about	how	they	see	hard	work	as	a	core	value	in	their	lives.	For	my	white	interviewees	whose	families	immigrated	to	America	generations	ago,	hard	work	was	not	associated	with	their	family’s	journey	to	America	as	much	as	it	was	associated	with	their	movement	up	the	economic	ladder.	There	were	few	interviewees	who	were	more	securely	atop	the	economic	ladder—and	self-aware	of	it—than	Interviewee	#13.		 A	freshman	psychology	student,	Interviewee	#13	is	from	a	suburb	of	East	Bay,	California.	She	shared	that	most	of	the	players	on	her	local	professional	basketball	team,	the	Golden	State	Warriors,	live	in	her	town:	growing	up,	her	friend	worked	at	a	coffee	shop	frequented	by	Warriors	superstar	Stephen	Curry	and	his	wife,	celebrity	chef	Ayesha	Curry.	Beyond	basketball	stars,	her	hometown	is	mostly	filled	with	people	who	have	successful	careers	in	Silicon	Valley—like	her	father,	who	used	to	work	at	Yahoo	and	now	is	with	Facebook,	where	he	was	one	of	the	first	one	hundred	people	to	work	at	the	now	giant	social	media	platform.	Interviewee	#13	looks	up	to	her	father	and	praises	the	work	he	has	put	in	to	provide	for	his	family	in	the	way	that	he	does:		 	
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My	dad	has	worked	his	ass	off	to	get	to	where	he	is	today.	That’s	the	thing	I	
don’t	think	a	lot	of	these	silver	spoon	liberals	notice	about	their	parents,	
because	a	lot	of	them	are	in	similar	situations,	because	of	this	big,	like,	tech	
boom,	basically.	All	these	people	who	work	in	Silicon	Valley	are	not	exactly	
coming	from,	like,	old	money	or	anything.	It’s	kind	of	like	the	first	generation	of	
really	wealthy	people	in	the	family.	I	don’t	think	a	lot	of	these	people	know	how	
hard	their	parents	worked	form	them	to	have	the	luxurious	life	that	they	have,	
driving	their	custom	[Mercedes	Benz]	G	Wagons	and	all	of	that.		Interviewee	#13	not	only	appreciates	her	father’s	hard	work,	but	she	also	sees	her	appreciation	as	a	quality	that	separates	her	from	her	more	left-leaning	peers	in	East	Bay.	She	talked	at	length	about	disagreements	she	would	have	with	fellow	affluent,	white	peers	at	her	“liberal”	private	high	school.	In	her	mind,	her	peers’	views	on	politics	and	resource	distribution	were	too	strong	for	people	who	“never	worked	a	day”	in	their	lives.	For	Interviewee	#13,	her	first	job	came	in	the	summer	of	2018.	Beyond	the	fact	that	she	“worked	with	children,”	she	did	not	specify	where	she	worked.	She	claimed	that	getting	her	paycheck	and	seeing	how	much	of	her	money	goes	back	to	the	government	via	taxes	really	solidified	her	position	against	taxation.	This	argument—that	one	must	work	themselves	and	see	their	own	earnings	go	to	the	government	via	taxation	in	order	to	truly	understand	how	taxes	work—came	up	throughout	my	conversations	with	Trump	supporters	on	campus.	Interviewee	#16,	a	freshman	from	the	suburbs	of	western	Massachusetts,	drew	from	his	experience	
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working	at	a	butcher	shop	to	share	with	me	why	he	thinks	the	American	government	taxes	people	at	an	unfair	rate:		
And	so	when	I'm	working,	I	work	at	a	butcher	shop.	I	work	part-time.	When	the	
state	of	Massachusetts	is	taking	like	$35	out	of	every	paycheck	when	I'm	
working	hard	hours,	I'm	doing	hard	physical	labor,	I'm	like:	where's	Elizabeth	
Warren?	I	mean,	she	wasn't	standing	next	to	me	doing	this	work.	She	wasn't	
doing	the	work	with	me.	I	work	and	then	she	gets	to	take	part	of	my	paycheck	
and	give	it	to	someone	who	doesn't	work	and	to	give	it	to	someone	who	just	has	
sat	and	lived	on	welfare	and	whose	families	have	done	welfare	for	multiple	
generations,	then,	uh,	no.	Sorry,	that's	my	money.			 To	Interviewee	#16,	taxes	are	a	mechanism	for	the	unfair	distribution	of	resources	from	those	who	work	hard	to	those	who	do	not	work	at	all—or,	at	least,	the	distribution	of	resources	from	those	who	work	hard	to	those	who	do	not	work	as	hard.	Interviewee	#13,	who	also	had	issues	with	how	her	work	paychecks	were	cut	by	taxes,	has	a	similar	viewpoint	on	taxation	as	Interviewee	#16:		
I	don't	think	that	money	that	people	who	work	hard	to	earn	should	go	to	
benefit	people	who	are	too	lazy	to	work.	I	know	that	there	are	a	lot	of	
situations	that	people	are	in	where	it	is	very	difficult	for	them	to	get	work	and	
make	money,	and	then	with	them	it's	like,	okay,	I	see	where	like,	welfare	comes	
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in.	But	there	are	a	lot	of	situations	where	like,	people	can	get	jobs	and	just	
aren't.			 Regardless	of	their	background,	my	interviewees	drew	from	personal	experiences	of	struggle	and	hard	work	to	justify	the	hardships	of	others.	Grievances	of	undocumented	immigrants	were	considered	illegitimate	by	interviewees	who	saw	them	as	“cutting	the	line”	that	their	families	so	patiently	waited	in	decades	ago—reminiscent	of	the	grievances	shared	by	Hochschild’s	(2016)	subjects,	whose	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	following	the	rules	was	echoed	by	my	interviewees.	The	struggles	of	those	in	poverty	or	receiving	welfare	benefits	were	discounted	by	interviewees	who	perceived	them	as	freeloaders—people	who	do	not	have	quality	work	ethics	and	thus	depend	on	handouts	from	harder	workers	higher	up	the	economic	ladder.	In	response	to	the	myriad	of	struggles	that	other	Americans	go	through	in	this	day	and	age,	interviewees,	for	the	large	part,	ignored	strategies	of	assisting	those	in	need	in	favor	of	rhetoric	that	insists	their	struggles	are	due	to	a	lack	of	hard	work	and	perseverance.		
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3.	“Is	this	redistribution	or	revenge?”	
	
	 Issues	regarding	identity	were	constantly	discussed	in	my	conversations	with	the	interviewees.	One	of	the	common	sentiments	I	gathered	was	the	idea	that	categories	of	difference—along	lines	of	race,	class,	gender,	and	sexual	orientation—were	seen	as	being	weaponized,	not	dismantled.	Tatum	(2003)	offers	a	useful	framework	for	analyzing	identity.	She	establishes	seven	categories	of	“otherness”	and	associates	each	category	with	a	form	of	oppression:	race	and	racism;	gender	and	sexism;	socioeconomic	status	and	classism;	and	more.	Within	each	category,	there	is	a	group	considered	dominant	and	a	group	considered	subordinate	or	targeted:	for	race,	whites	are	dominant	and	people	of	color	are	targeted;	for	gender,	cisgender	men	are	dominant	and	those	who	are	not	cisgender	men	are	targeted;	and	so	on.	All	of	my	interviewees	identified	with	at	least	one,	if	not	many,	of	the	dominant	groups	outlined	by	Tatum.	From	this	dominant	perspective,	interviewees	questioned	the	severity	of	identity-based	oppressions	(as	laid	out	by	Tatum).	Thus,	they	viewed	redistribution	in	response	to	those	oppressions	as	unfair—an	unjust	form	of	revenge	against	groups	considered	dominant.		 As	a	heterosexual,	cisgender	white	man	with	an	upper-class	upbringing,	I	shared	many	of	the	same	experiences	as	my	interviewees	in	terms	of	dealing	with	identity	from	the	dominant	group	perspective.	These	surface-level	similarities	gave	my	interviewees	a	level	of	comfort	to	share	perspectives	that	they	may	not	have	shared	to	an	interviewer	of	a	different	identity—largely	due	to	the	fact	that	their	perspectives	may	be	deemed	socially	unacceptable	or	politically	incorrect.	Interviewee	#16,	a	fellow	heterosexual,	cisgender	white	man	from	the	suburbs	of	
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Massachusetts,	expressed	a	fair	amount	of	disdain	for	political	correctness	and,	what	he	calls,	playing	the	“game	of	identity	politics.”	From	his	dominant	perspective,	Interviewee	#16	took	issue	with	how	his	background	influenced	how	others	perceived	his	opinions,	specifically	with	regards	to	race:		
So	the	way	I	see	it,	we	look	at	identity	and	I	go,	well,	especially	when	they're	
talking	about	immutable	character	traits,	things	that	I	can't	control.	I	cannot	
control	that	I'm	a	cisgender	straight	white	guy,	so	why	am	I	being	judged	or	
why	is	my	opinion	being	valued	more	or	less	than	somebody	else	of	different	
characteristics	based	on	things	I	can't	control?	Like	that	flies	right	in	the	face	of	
what	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	said,	"I	have	a	dream	that	one	day	my	four	kids	are	
gonna	be	judged	on	the	content	of	their	character	rather	than	the	color	of	their	
skin."	So	like	I	think	that	can	be	retroactively	applied	to	other	immutable	
characteristics	that	people	can't	control.		 In	his	view,	there	is	a	redistribution	of	attention	along	the	lines	of	race	wherein	white	men	like	him	are	being	unfairly	ignored	and	judged;	he	feels	that	others	are	discrediting	him	for	something	he	cannot	control.	Though	Interviewee	#16’s	feelings	may	be	genuine,	they	are	based	on	questionable	assumptions—namely,	that	there	are	few,	if	any,	barriers	that	hinder	people	of	color	from	enjoying	economic	and	social	benefits	afforded	to	white	people.	I	thus	asked	Interviewee	#16	a	follow-up	question	on	whether	he	thinks	white	men	are	at	a	disadvantage	today.	He	began	with	gender,	conceding	that	white	men	are	doing	great	on	“a	lot	of	
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metrics”	before	pivoting	to	statistics	showing	that	men	are	going	to	college	less	than	women,	in	an	effort	to	claim	that	some	men	are	at	a	“disadvantage.”	He	closed	with	this	statement,	weaving	in	the	race	component	of	my	question:		
I'd	say	white	men	are	still	on	top,	but	there's	no	structure	keeping	everybody	
else	behind.	Everyone	else	is	just	busy	getting	caught	up	and	the	evidence	would	
show	that	they	are	getting	caught	up.			 This	is	the	crux	of	Interviewee	#16’s	argument,	as	well	as	the	arguments	made	by	countless	other	interviewees	who	took	issue	with	identity	politics	that	centered	people	of	color:	oppression	and	inequality	certainly	existed	in	the	past	(as	evidenced	by	Interviewee	#16’s	invocation	of	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.;	he	was	not	the	only	interviewee	to	do	so),	but	they	no	longer	exist	today.	Claims	of	racism	in	the	present	were	deemed	illegitimate.	From	this	perspective,	prioritization	of	marginalized	voices	seems	like	unfair	revenge	for	issues	that	were	already	settled	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement.	This	perspective	is	certainly	controversial,	and	the	interviewees	were	aware	of	that.	In	the	words	of	Interviewee	#7,	a	white	freshman	who	self-identified	as	upper-middle	class:		
I	don't	believe	white	privilege	exists,	which	is	hot	take.	And	it	probably	would	
get	me	shot	on	campus.	There	would	probably	be	a	riot	if	I	said	that.	But	I	think	
privilege	comes	from	the	education	you	have	and	the	amount	of	money	your	
parents	have.	Not	the	color	of	your	skin.	And	it	just	happens	that	white	people	
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have	better	education	and	so	...	well,	Asians,	too.	We	have	more	money	than	
Latinos	and	African	Americans	on	the	whole.	So,	they	associate	whiteness	with	
success	and	privilege.	But	I	think	it	really	has	to	do	with	your	parents	and	your	
education.			 In	addition	to	race,	interviewees	took	issue	with	gender	identity	politics.	In	the	same	way	that	racism	was	seen	as	a	non-existent	issue,	interviewees	questioned	the	legitimacy	of	claims	that	gender	inequality	plagues	society	today.	One	of	those	critics	was	Interviewee	#6.	As	a	cisgender	woman,	Interviewee	#6	does	not	personally	relate	to	those	who	identify	as	transgender.	From	her	dominant	perspective	(though	Interviewee	#6	is	a	woman,	her	identity	as	a	cisgender	woman	makes	her	dominant	in	conversations	on	transgender	politics),	Interviewee	#6	rejects	notions	that	transgender	individuals	must	be	advocated	for:		
I	think	that	transgender	people,	like,	they're	not	being	discriminated	against.	I	
think	that	everyone	is	equal	under	the	law	and	(…)	they	shouldn't	have	any	
special	rights.	You	know,	just	like	women	are	like	right	now	pushing	for	extra	
rights,	and	like	affirmative	action,	things	like	that,	transgender	given	the	same,	
and	I	just	don't	think	it's	fair.			 Much	like	Interviewee	#16’s	views	on	the	treatment	of	people	of	color	in	society	today,	Interviewee	#6	rejects	claims	that	transgender	people	face	discrimination	despite	not	identifying	with	that	targeted	identity	herself.	Policies	
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geared	towards	representing	transgender	people	are	thus	perceived	as	“extra	rights”	rather	than	necessary	advocacy.	Interviewee	#6’s	perspective	on	gender,	like	Interviewee	#16’s	perspective	on	race,	is	informed	by	assumptions	that	many	people	would	disagree	with—and	she	is	aware	of	peoples’	objections	to	her	point	of	view:		
The	position	is	basically,	like:	it's	like	a	mental	disorder	and	that	we	shouldn't	
have	people	perform—you	shouldn't	like	perform	surgery,	you	should	actually	
treat	it	as	a	mental	disorder,	which	I	believe	it	is.	You	don't	have	to	agree,	but	
it's	just	the	way	I	view	it.	I	think	that	there	are	two	genders.	I	don't	think	you	
can	change	your	gender,	like,	I	think,	it's	just	scientifically	impossible.	And	if	I	
say	that	to	people,	they'd	call	me	like	a	bigot.	Even	if	I	say	that	to	like	my	
parents,	they're	like,	"How?	You're	crazy!"	You	know,	like,	I'm	really	not.			 Along	with	race	and	gender,	redistribution	along	class	lines	was	also	questioned	by	my	interviewees.	Of	the	sixteen	Trump	supporters	I	interviewed	for	this	study,	eleven	self-identified	as	either	“upper-middle”	or	“upper”	class	individuals.	Thus,	class	was	yet	another	aspect	identity	in	which	many	interviewees	identified	with	the	dominant	group.	Calls	for	economic	redistribution	were	met	with	great	objection	by	my	interviewees:	taxes	were	seen	as	an	unjust	burden,	theft	of	income	that	was	earned	through	hard	work.	Lower	tax	rates	were	associated	with	preservation	of	one’s	individual	freedoms	and	liberties.	
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	 When	asked	about	his	upbringing,	Interviewee	#4	was	honest	about	the	upper-class	privileges	he	enjoyed	growing	up.	He	mentioned	that,	although	his	family	frequently	moved	houses,	“every	house	we’ve	had	has	been	big.”	His	houses	always	impressed	friends	and	other	guests,	making	it	clear	to	Interviewee	#4	at	a	young	age	that	he	was	in	the	upper-class.	Interviewee	#4	described	his	hometown	as	a	conservative	suburb	north	of	Atlanta.	With	two	conservative	parents,	Interviewee	#4	says	he	was	“raised”	as	a	Republican	and	solidified	his	views	at	the	age	of	14,	when	he	claims	to	have	started	doing	“research”	on	economic	issues:	“I	just	like	those	right	policies	better	than	the	left.”		 In	many	ways,	Interviewee	#4’s	perspective	on	the	economy	that	he	says	he	developed	through	his	own	research	happens	to	align	with	the	economic	perspective	of	his	parents.	On	taxes,	for	example,	Interviewee	#4’s	argument	against	raising	taxes	mirrors	that	of	his	father:		
I	think,	for	one,	if	we	tax	too	much,	where’s	the	incentive	to	earn	more	and	work	
harder,	if	you’re	going	to	lose	half	of	what	you	earned	or	20%	or	what	the	heck.	
…	It’s	just	kind	of	like	common	sense.	Why	put	in	the	time	to	earn	a	lot	if	you’re	
just	going	to	earn	more	and	get	taxed	more	as	a	result	of	earning	more	money?	
So	it’s	just	common	sense	then	to	not	want	to	work	as	hard	if	you’re	going	to	
lose	even	more	of	it…	Parents	certainly	preached	that,	yeah.	Because	my	dad	
earned	a	lot,	too,	so	I	kind	of	grew	up	around	him	talking	about	getting	killed	
by	this	tax	or	this	tax.	So	that	was	certainly	a	topic	that	was	talked	about	a	lot	
in	my	house.	So	since	I	grew	up	around	that,	I	think	it	kind	of	formed	a	thought	
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process	of,	“Okay,	he’s	upset	about	this	tax	or	this	tax,	then	it’s	probably	not	a	
good	thing.”	So	that	also	helped	me	lean	right,	too.			 An	area	vice	president	of	a	large	medical	device	company,	Interviewee	#4’s	father	is	a	high-earner	(as	Interviewee	#4	mentions).	From	my	conversation	with	Interviewee	#4,	it	is	clear	that,	in	his	household,	taxes	were	presented	as	an	unfair	burden	levied	on	high-earners	like	his	family—they	were	“really	getting	killed	with	taxes	as	the	upper-class.”	Interviewee	#4	carried	this	disdain	for	taxes	when	he	got	his	first	paychecks	as	a	retirement	home	waiter	in	high	school.	Similar	to	Interviewee	#16’s	objection	to	getting	taxed	for	his	work	at	a	butcher	shop	in	high	school,	Interviewee	#4	talked	about	how	“seeing	first-hand”	his	own	paychecks	get	reduced	due	to	taxes	was	an	impetus	for	his	interest	in	conservative	economic	policy.		 My	interviewees’	critiques	of	redistribution,	as	outlined	in	this	chapter,	are	indicative	of	how	cultural	backlash	is	a	driving	force	in	their	support	for	President	Trump	(Inglehart	&	Norris,	2016;	Schaffner	et	al.,	2018;	Turney	et	al.,	2017).	Cultural	backlash	encompasses	the	sorts	of	anxieties	that	some	people	may	have	in	the	face	of	changing	societal	demographics.	These	sorts	of	anxieties	are	similar	to	the	feelings	expressed	by	my	interviewees,	as	they	rebuked	perspectives	that	sought	to	advocate	for	traditionally	targeted	identities	in	fear	that	those	of	traditionally	dominant	identities	(like	themselves)	would	be	forgotten.		 From	race	to	gender	to	class,	interviewees	rejected	redistribution	along	identity	lines.	This	redistribution	is	not	purely	material.	Redistribution	can	be	
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understood	in	terms	of	platforms,	as	efforts	to	center	the	voices	of	people	of	color	were	perceived	as	an	unfair	silencing	of	the	white	voice.	It	can	also	be	understood	in	terms	of	representation,	as	efforts	to	advocate	for	transgender	people	in	the	legal	system	were	seen	as	efforts	to	grant	“extra	rights”	to	those	who	are	not	cisgender.	When	identity	politics	were	brought	up	in	our	conversations,	interviewees	focused	on	the	purported	plight	of	dominant	groups.	In	many	ways,	they	saw	themselves	as	victims,	too.		 	
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4.	“I’m	a	victim,	too”			 For	some,	it	may	seem	backwards	to	associate	conservatism—an	ideology	centered	on	self-reliance—with	victimhood.	In	her	study	of	Tea	Partiers	in	Louisiana,	Hochschild	(2016)	found	that	her	subjects	rejected	notions	of	victimhood.	She	spent	time	in	highly	polluted	Louisiana	communities,	decimated	by	chemical	companies	like	Sasol	(formerly	Condea	Vista)	whose	wealth	rarely	trickled	down	to	those	of	the	communities	being	ravaged.	Taking	note	of	how	chemical	companies	were	exploiting	the	people	of	Louisiana,	Hochschild	argues	that	the	Tea	Partiers	she	met	were	“victims	without	a	language	of	victimhood”	(p.	131).	They	refused	to	see	themselves	as	victims	of	unregulated	chemical	companies:	they	would	rather	identify	“up”	with	oil	executives	than	identify	“down”	with	the	rest	of	society	(p.	222).		 My	interviewee	population	was	different	from	Hochschild’s.	The	middle	and	upper	class	suburbs	from	which	my	interviewees	primarily	hailed	were	far	from	the	dilapidated	towns	on	the	coast	of	Louisiana.	As	has	been	established,	a	large	part	(if	not	all)	of	my	interviewee	population	is	privileged	and	some	were	acutely	aware	of	that	fact.	From	my	perspective,	my	interviewees	were	less	interested	in	identifying	“up”	and	aspiring	for	more	than	they	were	in	maintaining	their	current	position	of	comfort.	Their	personal	philosophies	of	limited	government	interference	and	status-quo	maintenance	are	borne	out	of	the	respect	they	have	for	their	parents	and	those	who	came	before	them—the	ones	who,	as	they	see	it,	put	in	the	hard	work	to	put	them	in	the	privileged	positions	they	are	in	today.	
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	 Bhambra	(2017)	writes	about	the	narratives	of	distress	used	to	describe	white	populations	in	both	the	Brexit	and	Trump	campaigns.	Her	analysis	is	useful,	as	it	sheds	light	on	how	white	people	may	see	themselves	as	victims	when	their	relative	positions	of	advantage	are	challenged.	Though	not	every	one	of	my	interviewees	self-identified	as	white,	a	majority	of	them	did.	In	addition,	my	interviewees	were	all	relatively	advantaged	in	one	way	or	another—all	but	one	interviewee	identified	as	middle-class	or	higher,	and	every	interviewee	is	enjoying	the	benefits	of	attending	a	top	university	like	Boston	College.	Despite	these	advantages,	there	were	parts	of	my	interviewees’	lives	in	which	they	saw	themselves	as	victims:	from	taxes,	to	foreign	competition	in	the	labor	market,	to	affirmative	action.		 Just	as	Interviewee	#4	saw	his	family	as	getting	“killed	with	taxes,”	Interviewee	#2	saw	his	families	like	his	as	targets	of	national	tax	policy.	Interviewee	#2’s	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	his	family	and	taxes,	though,	was	not	quite	the	same	as	Interviewee	#4.	To	Interviewee	#4,	his	family	was	paying	a	large	amount	in	taxes	simply	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	in	the	upper-class;	as	Interviewee	#4	sees	it,	those	in	the	upper-class	(like	his	family)	pay	more	in	taxes,	in	general.	Interviewee	#2,	on	the	other	hand,	framed	his	family	as	unique	victims	of	taxes	due	to	their	peculiar	class	position—yes,	Interviewee	#2	self-identified	as	upper-class,	but	not	upper-class	enough	to	dodge	taxes:		
The	people	who	make	$10	million	or	above,	their	effective	tax	rate	is	like	20.	
What’s	the	federal	rate?	Like	40	or	so?	Their	tax	rates	reduce	by	half	because	
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they	can	afford	to	pay	these	tax	specialists	to	come	in	and	say,	“Oh,	put	your	
money	here,	here	and	here,	and	your	effective	tax	rate	will	be	half.”	Whereas	a	
family	like	mine	might	make	between	like	$500,000	and	$3,000,000	a	year,	so	
you	can’t	afford	to	pay	for	this	tax	specialist,	but	at	the	same	time	you’re	in	the	
top	tax	brackets,	so	you	are	just	getting	hit.	So	people	say,	like,	“Oh,	all	these	
upper-class	people	complain	about	taxes,	even	though	they’re	making	this	
much	money,”	but	it’s	like,	“Yeah,	after-tax	income’s	the	same	as	someone	who	
might	make	like	$150,000	or	so.”	Something	like	that,	I	don’t	know	the	exact	
numbers,	but	that’s	kind	of	my	thinking.			 Interviewee	#2’s	understanding	of	taxes	is	common,	but	misguided.	Since	the	United	States	follows	a	marginal	tax	system,	after-tax	income	will	always	rise	as	one’s	income	rises;	the	idea	that	the	after-tax	income	of	someone	making	$500,000	is	the	same	as	someone	making	$150,000	is	simply	untrue.	Regardless,	this	perspective	is	one	that	is	often	adopted	by	conservatives	when	expressing	their	fears	of	rising	tax	rates.	One	does	not	need	to	look	further	than	the	reaction	of	the	conservative	establishment	to	Representative	Alexandria	Ocasio-Cortez’s	tax	proposal	in	January.	Her	proposal	of	a	70%	top	federal	income	tax	rate	for	those	earning	$10	million	or	more	in	income	was	framed	as	a	general	70%	tax	rate,	as	House	Minority	Whip	Steve	Scalise	warned	on	Twitter	that	Ocasio-Cortez	was	planning	to	“take	away	70%	of	your	income	and	give	it	to	leftist	fantasy	programs”	(Hiltzik,	2019).	Such	a	framing	is	far	different	from	the	reality	of	the	proposal—which	is	that	the	70%	rate	would	not	come	into	effect	until	your	ten-millionth	dollar	
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earned,	and	every	dollar	earned	thereafter—yet	it	still	has	tremendous	influence	on	young	conservatives	like	Interviewee	#2,	who	see	their	high-earning	families	as	victims	of	national	tax	policy.		 Victimhood	was	not	solely	found	in	my	upper-class	interviewees.	Self-identified	as	middle-class,	Interviewee	#9	grew	up	in	the	suburbs	of	Massachusetts.	As	he	puts	it,	his	family	was	“never	rich,”	yet	“never	struggled	economically.”	He	described	his	parents	as	frugal	individuals	who	made	great	sacrifices	in	order	to	provide	for	him	and	his	brother.	In	talking	about	his	family,	Interviewee	#9	brought	up	his	father,	a	software	developer	who,	like	Interviewee	#9,	supports	President	Trump.	His	father’s	support	for	Trump	is	not	simply	the	current	iteration	in	his	long	history	of	conservatism;	in	fact,	Interviewee	#9	mentioned	how	his	father	actually	voted	for	President	Obama	in	both	the	2008	and	2012	elections.	By	the	end	of	Obama’s	second	term,	though,	Interviewee	#9’s	father	turned	against	the	former	president,	critiquing	welfare	policies	and	embodying	what	Interviewee	#9	describes	as	a	“classic	Republican.”		 I	was	interested	in	Interviewee	#9’s	father’s	transition	from	being	a	two-time	Obama	voter	to	a	Trump	supporter.	One	thing	that	was	evident	throughout	my	interviews	was	the	importance	of	parental	influence	on	college-aged	Trump	supporters—nearly	all	of	my	interviewees	had	at	least	one	parent	who	had	voted	for	President	Trump.	Thus,	I	asked	Interviewee	#9	to	explain	to	me	how	he	understood	his	father’s	transition	from	Obama	supporter	to	Trump	supporter,	as	it	may	shed	light	on	the	reasons	why	Interviewee	#9	supports	President	Trump,	as	well:		
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Relating	to	[my	dad’s]	work	[as	a	software	developer],	I	think	there	might	have	
been	one	reason	why	[he	supports	Trump].	I	remember	one	time,	he	was	talking	
about	like	foreign	competition	in	the	labor	market—of,	like,	people	coming	in	
with	work	visas	and	everything.	And	I	remember,	when	Trump	talked	about	it,	
[my	dad]	was	like	kind	of	happy	about	it.			 This	story	is	not	uncommon.	In	many	ways,	Interviewee	#9’s	father’s	fear	of	foreign	competition	in	the	labor	market	echoes	the	“economic	displacement”	hypothesis	that	many	scholars	have	considered	in	their	analyses	of	Trump	supporters	(Gidron	&	Hall,	2017;	Inglehart	&	Norris,	2016;	Schaffner	et	al.,	2018;	Turney	et	al.,	2017).	Beyond	this	one	part	of	my	conversation	with	Interviewee	#9,	though,	I	did	not	get	a	sense	from	my	interviewees	that	economic	displacement	played	an	influential	role	in	their	support	for	President	Trump.	Regardless,	his	perspective	reflected	the	general	perspective	of	my	interviewees	in	that	he	saw	himself	(or,	in	this	case,	his	father)	as	a	victim—and	President	Trump	as	his	advocate.		 	Perhaps	the	most	common	area	in	which	my	interviewees	saw	themselves	as	victims	was	with	affirmative	action.	With	a	predominantly	white	interviewee	pool,	it	was	not	necessarily	surprising	that	the	Trump	supporters	I	talked	to	were	opposed	to	affirmative	action	policies.	Tatum	(2003)	writes	about	the	relationship	between	white	identity	and	affirmative	action,	arguing	that	whites	who	fail	to	see	racism	as	a	system	of	advantage	that	benefits	white	people	also	tend	to	be	opposed	to	
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affirmative	action	policies.	My	interviewees’	denial	of	the	persistence	of	racial	inequality	and	oppression	has	already	been	established,	and	I	think	Tatum’s	(2003)	perspective	is	useful	in	understanding	my	interviewees’	positions	on	affirmative	action.		 When	it	comes	to	affirmative	action,	Interviewee	#2	spoke	in	his	typical	straightforward	fashion:		
I	completely	disagree	with	[affirmative	action],	in	my	personal	opinion,	because	
I	just	think	it	should	be	merit-based	only.	I	guess	that’s	because	I	didn’t	get	into	
certain	colleges	because	of	it…	Like,	for	me	specifically,	when	I	started	applying	
to	Ivy	League	institutions,	I	was	at	a	disadvantage	because	of	my	skin	color,	
because	affirmative	action.	So	in	that	instance	I	was	at	a	disadvantage.			 As	a	white	person,	Interviewee	#2	perceives	affirmative	action	in	college	admissions	as	a	policy	of	which	he	is	a	victim.	Tatum	(2003)	writes	about	the	“concern	about	white	disadvantage”	(p.	114)	that	is	at	the	heart	of	so	many	white	peoples’	criticism	of	affirmative	action	policies.	Interviewee	#2’s	proclamation	that	affirmative	action	puts	him	at	a	“disadvantage”	echoes	this	exact	concern.	Such	a	perspective	reframes	affirmative	action	from	a	policy	that	advocates	for	people	of	color	and	other	underrepresented	groups	to	a	policy	that	puts	white	people	at	a	disadvantage.		 Interviewee	#2	was	not	the	only	interviewee	who	drew	on	his	own	college	application	experience	in	his	criticism	of	affirmative	action.	Interviewee	#1,	a	white	
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freshman	from	South	Boston,	mentioned	how	he	refused	to	explicitly	reveal	his	race	in	the	college	application	process	in	fear	of	the	ramifications	he	thought	his	whiteness	would	have	on	his	chances	of	getting	into	good	schools:		
Especially	with	affirmative	action	while	applying	to	colleges,	I	didn’t	put	my	
race	down.	I	think	Asians	and	whites	are	negatively	impacted	by	[affirmative	
action]…	White	privilege	and	male	privilege	exist	in	certain	aspects	of	our	
society,	but	it’s	not	as	big	as	the	media	portrays	it	to	be.	You	go	to	Dunkin’	
Donuts	and	there’s	a	Muslim	woman	that	takes	your	order,	you	say	“thank	you,	
have	a	nice	day.”	Then	you	go	to	the	library	and	an	Asian	man	gives	you	your	
book.	Where’s	the	racism	there?	It’s	just	people	treating	people	fairly,	it	doesn’t	
matter	what	you	look	like.	The	media	is	just	portraying	it	as	a	plague	in	
American	society,	and	I	just	don’t	think	that’s	true.			 At	the	basis	of	Interviewee	#1’s	critique	of	affirmative	action	is	his	denial	of	the	power	dynamics	against	which	affirmative	action	policies	are	designed	to	fight.	By	denying	the	existence	of	the	power	dynamics	that	put	white	people	at	an	advantage	in	society	today,	Interviewee	#1	is	able	to	deny	the	need	for	affirmative	action	in	the	first	place.	Moreover,	this	denial	makes	it	easier	for	Interviewee	#1	to	frame	affirmative	action	as	a	policy	that	unfairly	targets	white	people	like	him.		 The	passion	with	which	my	interviewees	spoke	out	against	affirmative	action	was	a	real	reflection	of	their	sense	of	victimhood	on	the	issue.	They	saw	affirmative	action	not	as	unfair,	but	as	an	injustice—and	they	were	the	victims.	This	passion	
	 53	
was	perhaps	most	strongly	exemplified	by	Interviewee	#7.	In	our	conversation,	the	topic	of	affirmative	action	came	up	as	Interviewee	#7	was	expressing	his	distaste	for	Senator	Elizabeth	Warren	and	his	disagreement	with	those	who	are	outraged	about	President	Trump’s	treatment	of	Senator	Warren.	To	Interviewee	#7,	Senator	Warren	is	the	epitome	of	why	affirmative	action	is	an	ineffective	policy—he	described	her	as	“running	around	saying	she’s	part	of	the	Cherokee	Nation,	and	benefitting	from	it,”	noting	the	“conservative	ire”	that	comes	out	in	response	to	stories	like	Senator	Warren’s.		 Fueled	by	his	firm	belief	that	affirmative	action	policies	are	unjust,	Interviewee	#7’s	passion	increased	as	he	talked	more	about	his	views	on	the	subject.	He	transitioned	from	critiques	of	Senator	Warren	to	a	personal	story	about	two	students	from	his	high	school	that	both	applied	to	Georgia	Tech;	a	white	girl	and	a	black	boy.	To	Interviewee	#7,	this	story	serves	as	an	example	of	how	affirmative	action	is	a	flawed	policy:		
But	then	they	denied	a	girl	who	had	a	1570	on	the	SAT.	A	perfect	math	score	
and,	what	is	that,	a	70	on	reading—the	highest	in	one	sitting	for	our	school	
that	year.	And	she	was	wait	listed,	and	then	denied.	She	got	into	Vanderbilt	and	
is	now	at	TC	on	a	full	ride.	Anyway,	that's	beside	the	point.	The	point	being	that	
he	was	accepted	and	she	was	denied.	He	was	probably	only	accepted—because	
he	didn't	have	a	stellar	extracurriculars,	like,	he	was	getting,	I	know	what	he	
did,	he	was	a	drug	dealer	at	one	point.	He	got	in,	which,	everyone	knew	why	he	
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got	in.	He	even	knew	why	he	got	in.	He	got	in	because	he	was	black.	There	was	
no	reason	he	should've	gotten	in.			 Interviewee	#7	mentioned	how,	to	him,	this	story	serves	as	proof	that	affirmative	action	is	“dangerous”:	not	only	was	a	qualified	white	student	not	admitted	into	the	university,	but	a	black	student	whom	he	deemed	unqualified	was	accepted	instead.	In	telling	the	story,	it	was	clear	that	Interviewee	#7	identified	with	the	white	applicant	who	was	not	accepted	into	Georgia	Tech.	This	identification	comes	with	the	fact	that	Interviewee	#7,	like	my	other	interviewees,	sees	affirmative	action	as	a	policy	that	puts	all	white	people	at	a	disadvantage:	white	critics	of	affirmative	action	not	only	see	themselves	at	a	disadvantage	at	an	individual	level,	but	see	white	people,	as	a	whole,	at	a	disadvantage	as	well.	Due	to	this,	it	is	unsurprising	that	Interviewee	#7	identified	so	heavily	with	the	white	girl	from	his	high	school	who	was	not	accepted	into	Georgia	Tech:	he	sees	himself	in	that	white	applicant,	and	all	other	white	college	applicants	who	he	believes	are	fellow	victims	of	unjust	affirmative	action	policies.		 Ultimately,	victimhood	is	a	touchy	subject	amongst	conservatives.	I	am	sure	that	if	my	interviewees	were	asked	to	describe	themselves,	the	word	“victim”	would	not	be	the	first	word	to	come	out	of	their	mouths.	Through	my	extended	conversations	with	Trump	supporters	on	campus,	though,	it	was	clear	that	feelings	of	victimhood	were	shared	across	the	interviewee	population.	As	certain	topics	of	conversation	came	up,	it	was	evident	that	my	interviewees	saw	themselves	as	victims:	their	families	were	burdened	with	high	taxes,	threatened	by	foreign	
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competition	in	the	labor	market,	and	targeted	by	affirmative	action	policies.	Regardless	of	the	rhetorical	denial	of	victimhood	in	some	conservative	circles,	I	argue	that	a	recognition	of	feelings	of	victimhood	amongst	non-working	class	Trump	supporters	is	essential	if	one	wants	to	understand	their	perspective.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	feelings	of	victimhood	are	justified—but	they	are	real,	and	these	feelings	are	at	the	heart	of	their	support	for	President	Trump.																		
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5.	“We	are	not	alone”		 In	doing	this	project,	my	goal	was	not	to	simply	seek	out	individual	Trump	supporters	on	campus	and	ask	them	to	share	their	personal	opinions	on	politics;	rather,	I	set	out	to	study	Trump	supporters	at	Boston	College,	as	a	community.	I	was	hoping	to	learn	about	how	Boston	College	Trump	supporters	talk	about	politics	on	campus	and	the	ways	in	which	like-minded	conservatives	congregate	on	campuses	like	Boston	College.	There	is	plenty	of	social	science	literature	that	looks	into	the	influence	of	group	dynamics	on	one’s	political	perspective	(Bail	et	al.,	2018;	Mutz,	2002;	Pettigrew	&	Tropp,	2006):	the	information	and	perspectives	that	one	is	exposed	to	presumably	affect	where	one	stands,	politically.	Thus,	in	my	interviews,	I	sought	out	to	learn	how	my	interviewees	coexisted	with	other	students	on	campus:	while	some	felt	more	like	outcasts	than	others,	it	was	clear	that—despite	assumptions	of	college	campuses	as	liberal	echo	chambers—my	interviewees	were	not	alone	on	campus	in	their	support	of	President	Trump.		 The	degree	to	which	my	interviewees	expressed	their	support	for	Trump	on	campus	varied.	A	self-described	“pretty	vocal	conservative,”	Interviewee	#5	was	certainly	one	of	the	more	outspoken	Trump	supporters	I	interviewed	for	this	project.	As	such,	Interviewee	#5	has	engaged	in	many	conversations	with	fellow	students	on	campus	with	regards	to	politics—in	these	conversations,	Interviewee	#5	is	unafraid	to	profess	his	support	for	President	Trump.	Through	these	conversations,	Interviewee	#5	claims	to	have	found	a	certain	trend	amongst	conservatives	on	Boston	College’s	campus:		
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	 I	know	a	lot	of	people	on	campus	that	are	like	closet	conservatives.			 This	idea	of	a	“closet	conservative”	rang	true	with	responses	I	got	from	my	other	interviewees	regarding	conservatism	on	Boston	College’s	campus:	though	conservatives	on	campus	may	not	all	be	outspoken,	they	certainly	exist—and	perhaps	in	larger	numbers	than	one	may	expect.	As	Interviewee	#5	shared,	the	typical	response	he	gets	from	asking	people	if	they	are	Republican	is	one	of	secrecy:	“Yeah,	but	don’t	tell	anyone.”		 The	reason	why	“closet	conservatism”	may	be	phenomenon	on	Boston	College’s	campus	is	clear:	to	be	a	conservative	is	not	seen	as	a	socially	desirable	position,	even	by	conservatives	themselves.	This	issue	of	social	desirability	was	outlined	clearly	by	Interviewee	#1:		
The	silent	majority	really	does	exist.	I’m	not	out	here	wearing	my	Make	
America	Great	Again	hat,	because	people	aren’t	going	to	talk	to	me.	
		 As	a	follow-up,	I	asked	Interviewee	#1	to	clarify	his	statement	on	the	“silent	majority”	of	Trump	supporters	and	whether	or	not	it	exists	at	Boston	College.	He	described	President	Trump’s	support	on	campus	as,	“Silent.	I	wouldn’t	say	majority.”	This	description	is	consistent	with	what	I	gathered	from	my	other	interviews:	though	support	for	President	Trump	is	not	shared	amongst	the	majority	of	students,	it	is	kept	under	wraps	by	the	significant	number	of	students	who	do.	
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	 Interviewee	#1	was	not	the	only	interviewee	that	expressed	concern	about	the	social	repercussions	that	would	come	with	his	peers	knowing	about	his	support	for	President	Trump.	Several	of	my	interviewees	expressed	relief	that	the	interviews	would	be	confidential;	one	even	proclaimed	that	their	answers	in	the	interview	would	“probably	get	[them]	lynched	on	campus.”	One	interviewee	in	particular,	Interviewee	#14,	was	rather	forthright	in	expressing	his	fear	of	publicizing	his	support	for	President	Trump:	
	
In	BC,	in	general,	I	am	more	tempered	in	my	views.	I	really	do	hide	it.	I'll	be	
right	out,	like,	I	hide	it,	'cause	I	know.	I	don't	want	my	personal	relationships	to	
be	affected,	I	don't	want	my	track	here	to	be	affected	either,	in	negative	light	
and	I	am	genuinely	afraid	of	being	misconstrued	so	that	my	career	here	is	
ruined.	I	feel	like	I	could	see	that	happening,	'cause	it	has	happened	to	people	
here,	before.			 Though	Interviewee	#14’s	fears	were	perhaps	more	extreme	than	some	of	the	other	interviewees,	his	anxieties	about	the	repercussions	that	his	support	for	President	Trump	would	have	on	his	personal	relationships	were	widely	shared	amongst	the	interviewees.	One	notable	trend	I	found	was	that	there	was	a	significant	level	of	fear	from	the	female	interviewees,	in	particular,	about	being	socially	ostracized	due	to	their	support	for	President	Trump.	A	few	of	the	women	I	spoke	to	mentioned	how	even	their	close	friends	and	roommates	do	not	know	about	
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their	support	for	President	Trump.	For	Interviewee	#6,	this	refusal	to	share	her	politics	with	her	friends	is	borne	out	of	fear:		
But	then	when	I	came	to	BC	and	have	really	established	my	views,	I	didn't	tell	
anyone.	Like,	my	roommates	still	don't	know.	I'm	afraid	to	say	my	opinion	
because	I'd	probably	be,	like,	harassed.			 This	leaves	conservative	women	on	Boston	College’s	campus	in	quite	a	predicament:	not	only	are	they	part	of	the	minority	of	students	on	campus	who	support	President	Trump,	but	they	are	also	a	minority	within	that	Trump-supporting	cohort	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	women.	As	Interviewee	#3	says,	conservative	social	networks	on	campus	are,	“Demographically,	almost	always	guys.”		 In	my	conversations	with	my	female	interviewees,	I	wanted	to	learn	more	about	what	it	is	like	to	navigate	Boston	College’s	campus	as	a	conservative	woman,	and	the	ways	in	which	conservative	women	on	campus	do	(or	do	not)	connect	with	one	another.	When	I	asked	Interviewee	#11	if	she	was	able	to	find	a	community	of	like-minded	conservatives	on	campus,	her	response	was	negative:		
Not	really.	No.	That's	like	part	of	why	I	joined	the	College	Republicans	was	to	
find	that.	Unfortunately,	we	don't	meet	that	often.	So	it's	kind	of	sad.		
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	 For	women	like	Interviewee	#13,	difficulty	in	building	social	networks	of	conservative	women	on	campus	is	expected.	As	she	sees	it,	women	always	tend	to	be	more	liberal	because	they	are	more	likely	to	empathize	with	liberal	social	policies.	As	a	result,	she	argues,	“The	number	of	conservative	women	out	there	is	very	slim.”	With	this	perspective	in	mind,	Interviewee	#13	looks	to	men	on	campus	when	she	wants	to	engage	with	like-minded	individuals.	She	talked	about	how	fortunate	she	was	to	have	met	men	on	campus,	like	her	boyfriend,	who	share	her	conservative	political	perspective:		
But	I	think	that,	like,	it	would	definitely	be	hard	if	I,	like,	weren't	me	and	didn't	
like	talking	about	sports	and	just	kind	of	naturally	gravitate	towards	having	a	
lot	of	friends	who	are	guys,	I	think	that	it	would	be	very,	very	difficult.	And	I	
think	that's	something	that	I've	just	gotten	really	lucky	with.			 Not	all	conservative	women	on	campus	are	as	“lucky”	as	Interviewee	#13	in	their	attempts	to	meet	like-minded	friends.	Interviewee	#15	talked	about	her	difficulties	as	a	conservative	woman	on	campus,	and	the	discomfort	she	feels	at	most	campus	events:		
I've	never	felt	comfortable	going	to	any	of	the	events	that	they've	held	here,	
whether	it's	the	Woman's	Summit	or	any	of	that	because	I	felt	like	it	would	
always	be	coming	from	a	liberal	perspective	and	even	though	people	might	say	
like,	“Oh,	like	we	still	want	your	voice	to	be	heard,”	and	stuff	like,	“Sure	we'll	
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listen	to	your	comments,”	no	one	was	going	to	support	me.	So	I	have	been	
turned	off	by	that	on	BC's	campus.			 In	response	to	this	discomfort—and	her	awareness	that	she	is	not	the	only	conservative	woman	on	campus	who	feels	like	she	does—Interviewee	#15	is	making	an	effort	to	formally	connect	conservative	women	at	Boston	College.	Her	plan	is	to	establish	a	Network	of	enlightened	Women	(NeW)	chapter	at	Boston	College.	According	to	Interviewee	#15,	the	goal	of	NeW	is	to	establish	chapters	on	different	college	campuses	across	the	country	in	order	to	have	a	“network	of	women	look	at	political	issues,	particularly	women’s	issues	from	a	conservative	perspective.”	Interestingly	enough,	Interviewee	#12	also	mentioned	her	plans	to	be	on	the	board	for	Boston	College’s	NeW	chapter.	Schreiber	(2008)	writes	about	how	conservative	women’s	organizations	(such	as	Concerned	Women	for	America	and	Independent	Women’s	Forum)	have	been	central	to	the	rise	of	conservatism	amongst	women	in	the	United	States	since	the	Reagan	era.	These	efforts	by	Interviewee	#15	and	Interviewee	#12	to	establish	a	Boston	College	NeW	chapter	continues	in	this	tradition	of	conservative	women’s	organizations	bringing	conservative	women	together.	Though	Trump	supporters	on	campus—especially	the	women	with	whom	I	talked—do	feel	that	a	stigma	is	attached	to	their	political	perspective,	this	does	not	mean	that	all	Trump	supporters	are	loners	on	campus.	Rather,	they	have	found	ways	to	build	networks	of	like-minded	conservatives	in	response	to	their	shared	
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feelings	of	social	censorship.	It	is	within	these	networks	that	Trump	supporters	on	campus	share	their	ideas	and	reaffirm	their	political	perspectives.	Attempts	to	build	conservative	networks	on	campus	range	from	the	explicit	and	overt	(such	as	the	Republicans	Society,	or	the	upcoming	NeW	chapter)	to	the	discreet	and	covert	(such	as	private	friendships	or	other	personal	relationships).	One	of	the	more	covert	ways	that	Trump	supporters	connect	at	Boston	College	is	in	the	classroom.	As	Interviewee	#10	explains,	connections	can	be	built	with	fellow	conservatives	with	the	simple	nod	of	the	head:		
I've	met	Trump	supporters	either	in	BC	Republicans	or	I've	met	them	in	
classrooms	where	our	professor	makes	a	comment,	and	it's	a	small	classroom	of	
12	people	or	something	like	that.	And	you	kind	of	look	around	the	room,	and	
there's	someone	else	looking	around	the	room	scratching	their	head.	And	when	
the	professor’s	made	a	comment	two	or	three	times,	you	kind	of	approach	each	
other	and	you're	like,	"Hey,	what	do	you	think,	what	do	you	think	about	
Trump?"			 Connections	within	the	classroom	are	not	always	covert.	As	Interviewee	#14	explains,	conservatives	see	certain	classes	on	campus	as	more	accepting	of	their	perspectives	than	others.	In	these	courses,	conservatives	do	not	need	to	keep	their	mouth	shut	and	find	each	other	after	class	ends,	as	Interviewee	#10	has	experienced—they	feel	free	to	join	in	on	the	class	conversation.	For	Interviewee	#14,	he	has	found	comfort	in	his	political	science	courses,	where	he	feels	that	there	
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is	more	room	for	debate	(and,	thus,	more	room	for	him	to	share	his	conservative	perspective	without	lethal	social	repercussions):		
When	it	comes	to	Poli	Sci	class,	though,	I	feel	free	to	express	myself	because	I	
think—at	least	in	all	the	classes	I've	taken	so	far—there's	that	mutual	respect	
for	ideas	and	I	feel	like	Poli	Sci	majors	understand	the	need	for	debate.	I'm	
lucky	that	I've	encountered	that	so	I've	been	more	open	and	more	expressive	
about	my	views.			 Beyond	the	classroom,	another	space	on	campus	where	conservatives	can	meet	is	the	church.	Many	of	my	interviewees	talked	about	the	influence	of	their	Catholic	upbringing,	and	some	have	continued	to	be	active	in	the	church	community	at	Boston	College—Interviewee	#14,	for	example,	lectures	at	campus	Mass	and	is	a	Eucharistic	minister.	One	interviewee	who	has	been	especially	successful	in	building	conservative	networks	through	the	church	community	is	Interviewee	#8.	When	I	asked	her	about	her	experiences	in	finding	like-minded	individuals	on	campus,	Interviewee	#8	immediately	brought	up	her	community	at	the	church:		
I	think	that	coming	here	I've	already	found	like	a	really	good	core	group	of	kids	
who	share	the	same	values	as	me—who	are	Catholic	and	conservative.	So,	I've	
been	going	to	church	with	a	group	of	like	five	kids—most	of	them	are	guys	
actually	and	maybe	like	two	of	them	are	girls.	And	we	just	go	to	church	and	like	
also	we	go	to	some	of	the	same	clubs	together,	like	Thomas	More	society	and	
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College	Republicans	and	Pro-Life	Club.	And	so	I've	already	found	like	my	group	
so	I	feel	a	lot	more	eased	into	it.			 For	Interviewee	#8,	this	conservative	social	network	is	both	a	pleasure	and	a	surprise.	She	talked	about	how	her	experience	in	high	school	at	Milton	Academy	(a	college	preparatory	boarding	school	just	outside	of	Boston)	was	far	less	positive:	at	Milton,	Interviewee	#8	felt	that	the	liberal	environment	left	no	room	for	conservative	women	like	herself.	At	Boston	College,	she	says	her	experience	has	been	far	more	positive:		
Yeah.	I	actually	really	wasn't	expecting	it.	Because	when	I	went	to	orientation	
there	was	a	lot	of	presentations	we	had	to	go	through	and	I	was	like,	okay,	this	
is	gonna	be	like	just	Milton	all	over	again.	Like,	I'm	really	gonna	get	kind	of	like	
suppressed	in	my	views	just	because	there's	so	much	sort	of	new	like	
progressive	way	of	thinking.	Obviously	it's	like	a	very	liberal,	intellectual	
community.	…	But	what	I	didn't	know	is	that	there	were	gonna	be	kids	who	also	
were	having	like	the	same	feelings	in	these	presentations.	And	that	like	they	
were	all	gonna	like	come	together	sort	of	and	like	sort	of	find	each	other	within	
the	first	month	and	see	each	other	in	mass	every	weekend	and	then	start	going	
to	all	these	groups	together	and,	like,	I'm	just	really	happy	that	it	happened	
that	way.		
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	 As	she	says	later	in	our	conversation,	Interviewee	#8	has	enjoyed	life	at	Boston	College	because	she	finally	feels	like	“there	are	people	on	[her]	side,	too”	and	that	things	are	“not	so	one-sided	anymore.”	This	positive	perspective	is	especially	unique	given	Interviewee	#8’s	identity	as	a	woman	and	the	general	consensus	amongst	my	female	interviewees	that	there	are	certain	social	struggles	that	are	endured	specifically	by	female	conservatives	on	campus.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Interviewee	#8	does	mention	how,	in	her	church	community,	“most	of	them	are	guys.”	Similar	to	Interviewee	#13,	Interviewee	#8	has	had	more	success	finding	like-minded	conservative	men	on	campus	than	conservative	women.		 Perhaps	the	most	extreme	case	of	conservative	networking	I	found	amongst	my	interviewees	was	with	Interviewee	#4	and	Interviewee	#7.	When	I	talked	with	Interviewee	#4,	he	mentioned	how	his	floor	(a	freshman	residential	building)	is	heavily	comprised	of	Trump	supporters:		
I’ve	certainly	met	a	lot	of	other	kids	who	lean	right	with	me,	too…	Our	floor	is	
42	total	people,	and	I	would	say	I’ve	probably	talked	to	about	25	of	them,	or	
around	that,	that	I	know	for	a	fact	are	fans	of	Trump.			 I	was	shocked	by	Interviewee	#4’s	estimation.	Sure,	I	was	aware	that	there	are	plenty	of	conservatives	on	Boston	College’s	campus—that	is	part	of	the	reason	why	I	chose	to	do	this	project—but	25	out	of	42	students	in	the	hall	sounded	like	quite	a	large	ratio.	Due	to	my	skepticism,	I	initially	wrote	off	Interviewee	#4’s	claim	as	an	exaggeration.	Then,	in	my	conversation	with	Interviewee	#7,	he	shared	that	he	
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is	living	with	Interviewee	#4.	I	took	this	opportunity	to	ask	Interviewee	#7	if	he	could	corroborate	Interviewee	#4’s	claims	about	their	hall	being	especially	conservative,	and	he	did:		
I	was	surprised.	I	was	expecting	to	be	one	of	the	few	[Trump	supporters],	being	
from	Georgia,	and	everyone's	from	the	northeast.	And	I	was	like	walking	in	and	
I'm	like,	"All	right.	Here	we	go.	I'll	be	the	only	conservative."	And	then	most	of	
the	people	in	my	hall	are	conservative.	I	was	like,	“Wow.	How	did	I	get	this	
lucky?”	But	I	think,	honestly,	across	the	board,	and	at	orientation,	in	my	room,	
five	out	of	six	guys	were	conservative.	I	think,	at	least	in	the	male	population	of	
the	school,	there’s	a	lot	more	conservatives	than	people	would	expect.			 Though	Interviewee	#4	and	Interviewee	#7’s	situation	may	be	an	outlier,	it	serves	as	an	example	of	how	conservatives	at	Boston	College—especially	conservative	men—do	not	always	have	to	look	far	to	find	like-minded	individuals	on	campus.	Whether	they	are	in	class,	at	church,	or	in	their	dorm	rooms,	conservatives	at	Boston	College	are	not	alone.	Regardless	of	the	stigmatization	they	may	feel	from	their	more	liberal	peers,	conservatives	at	Boston	College	are	likely	to	find	other	individuals	who	feel	targeted	in	the	same	way	and	connect	due	to	their	shared	experiences	as	conservatives	on	campus.		 By	forming	these	conservative	networks,	I	argue	that	my	interviewees	and	other	Trump	supporters	at	Boston	College	become	more	emboldened	in	their	opposition	to	mainstream	liberal	discourse	on	campus.	Much	has	been	written	on	
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the	positive	effects	of	intergroup	contact	between	opposing	political	groups,	both	in	terms	of	its	ability	to	decrease	political	polarization	(Pettigrew	&	Tropp,	2006)	and	increase	the	likelihood	of	deliberation	and	political	compromise	(Mutz,	2002).	These	beneficial	aspects	of	intergroup	contact	do	not	represent	what	I	found	in	my	interviews:	my	interviewees	largely	spoke	of	liberal	campus	discourse	with	disdain,	not	with	appreciation	for	differing	perspectives.	From	Interviewee	#7’s	anger	with	the	“intolerance”	of	his	purportedly	anti-Trump	“Courage	to	Know”	seminar	to	Interviewee	#16’s	description	of	the	Lynch	School	of	Education	as	a	“leftist	indoctrination	camp,”	my	interviewees	did	not	speak	fondly	of	non-conservative	influences	on	campus.		 One	thing	to	consider	is	whether	or	not	my	interviewees	would	be	more	receptive	to	non-conservative	points	of	view	without	the	reaffirmation	they	get	through	their	conservative	networks.	Interviewee	#7,	for	example,	may	have	been	more	willing	to	consider	the	perspectives	in	his	“Courage	to	Know”	class	if	he	did	not	go	home	afterwards	to	a	hall	full	of	conservatives	who	would	agree	with	(and	effectively	legitimize)	his	reservations	with	the	course.	Recent	research	shows	that	modern-day	conservatives	are	rarely	receptive	to	liberal	points	of	view:	in	their	experiment	assigning	study	participants	a	Twitter	bot	of	opposing	political	ideology	for	one	month,	Bail	et	al.	(2018)	found	that	Republicans	became	substantially	more	conservative	after	one	month	of	exposure	to	a	liberal	Twitter	bot,	while	Democrats	exhibited	non-statistically	significant	increases	in	liberal	attitudes	after	one	month	of	exposure	to	a	conservative	Twitter	bot.	This	echoes	what	I	found	in	my	interviews,	as	the	Trump	supporters	I	talked	to	never	recalled	moments	when	
	 68	
liberal	influences	on	campus	shifted	their	own	political	perspectives	to	the	left.	In	fact,	the	sentiment	I	gathered	was	that	these	liberal	influences	only	further	solidified	my	interviewees’	positions	as	conservatives.		 It	is	insufficient	to	study	Trump	supporters	on	Boston	College’s	campus	without	considering	the	group	dynamics	outlined	in	this	chapter.	It	is	necessary	to	identify	the	kinds	of	discreet	and	non-discreet	conservative	networks	that	exist	on	campus	if	one	wants	to	develop	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	perspectives	of	Trump-supporting	students.	Though	some	may	assume	that	the	kinds	of	people	I	interviewed	may	be	outliers	or	outcasts	on	a	liberal	college	campus—that	is	certainly	not	the	case.	Trump	supporters	may	not	dictate	the	terms	of	campus	social	life	or	find	themselves	at	the	center	of	campus	discourse,	but	their	presence	at	Boston	College	is	undeniable.												
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CONCLUSION		 A	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	rise	of	President	Trump	requires	an	analysis	of	Trump	supporters	that	goes	beyond	tropes	of	the	white	working-class.	As	has	been	established,	there	has	been	undue	focus	on	the	working-class	identity	of	President	Trump’s	supporters	given	that	Trump’s	supporters	are,	by	many	measures,	a	relatively	privileged	group	of	people	(Walley,	2017;	Manza	&	Crowley,	2017;	Bhambra,	2017).	My	project	addresses	this	issue	by	focusing	on	Trump	supporters	at	Boston	College,	and	my	findings	indicate	that	President	Trump	appeals	to	non-working	class	individuals	in	a	variety	of	ways.		 President	Trump’s	economic	appeal	to	my	interviewees	is	fairly	straightforward.	Especially	for	my	upper	and	upper-middle	class	interviewees,	the	idea	of	supporting	a	politician	who	pushes	for	low	taxes	and	deregulation	is	seemingly	in	their	self-interest.	The	theoretical	framework	of	rational	choice	theory	(Abell,	2000)	explains	this	thought	process:	for	those	who	are	good	economic	standing,	support	for	President	Trump	can	seem	like	the	rational	choice	to	make.		 In	addition	to	economics,	President	Trump	appeals	to	my	interviewees	in	terms	of	values.	Interviewees	talked	at	length	about	the	importance	of	hard	work	in	their	lives	and	the	ways	in	which	their	families	were	able	to	overcome	struggle	through	working	hard.	For	my	interviewees,	President	Trump	is	perceived	as	an	advocate	for	hard-workers	like	themselves,	while	liberals	are	seen	as	advocates	for	freeloaders	and	lazy	dependents.	This	framing	of	the	liberal	perspective	as	an	affront	to	hard	work	echoes	the	attitudes	of	the	Louisiana	Tea	Partiers	profiled	by	Hochschild	(2016).	
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	 Lastly,	President	Trump	appeals	to	my	interviewees’	perspectives	on	issues	concerning	identity.	Tatum’s	(2003)	theoretical	framework	for	analyzing	identity—and	the	distinctions	she	makes	between	dominant	and	targeted	identities—is	especially	helpful	in	understanding	this	aspect	of	President	Trump’s	appeal.	Interviewees	expressed	significant	disdain	for	policies	that	explicitly	advocate	for	targeted	identities.	A	prime	example	of	this	kind	of	policy	is	affirmative	action,	which	was	perceived	by	the	interviewees	as	unfair	policy	that	puts	white	people	at	a	disadvantage.	Many	of	my	white	interviewees,	in	particular,	framed	themselves	as	victims	in	conversations	on	affirmative	action,	and	narratives	of	victimization	were	common	throughout	my	interviews.	These	feelings	of	victimization	fueled	their	support	for	President	Trump,	who	is	seen	as	someone	who	shares	their	disdain	for	policies	like	affirmative	action	and	fights	for	those	of	dominant	identities.		 President	Trump’s	appeal	to	my	interviewees	is	significant	given	the	sizeable	presence	of	Trump	supporters	on	Boston	College’s	campus.	Through	my	interviews,	I	learned	about	networks	of	conservatives	on	campus	that	I	was	never	before	aware	of.	These	networks	are	formed	in	class,	at	church,	and	in	clubs—and	they	are	perhaps	larger	than	many	would	expect.	Due	to	this	presence	of	Trump	supporters	on	campus,	I	have	recommendations	for	future	research	on	this	population.		 It	would	be	interesting	to	see	what	would	result	from	a	project	focused	solely	on	conservative	women	at	Boston	College.	From	my	interviews,	I	got	a	sense	that	conservative	women	on	campus	have	a	far	different	experience	than	conservative	men	with	regards	to	connecting	with	like-minded	peers.	A	project	that	sets	out	to	understand	the	experience	of	conservative	women	on	campus,	specifically,	would	be	
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beneficial	towards	understanding	this	gendered	phenomenon.	Such	a	project	could	engage	with	questions	regarding	the	kinds	of	issues	that	are	emphasized	by	conservative	women,	as	well	as	the	kinds	of	networks	that	conservative	women	draw	on.		 In	a	similar	fashion,	second-generation	immigrant	conservatives	would	be	an	intriguing	population	to	hone	in	on	for	future	research.	In	my	interviews,	I	found	that	those	with	parents	who	had	immigrated	to	the	United	States	were	especially	passionate	about	values	of	hard	work	and	playing	by	the	rules.	I	think	that	a	study	focused	solely	on	this	population	of	conservatives	would	be	useful	in	understanding	why	they	are	so	passionate	about	these	values.		 Finally,	it	would	be	useful	to	conduct	a	similar	study	to	my	own	that	includes	upperclassmen	in	the	interviewee	pool.	Given	that	all	of	my	interviewees	were	underclassmen,	it	was	difficult	to	gauge	the	influence	of	campus	life	at	Boston	College	on	the	political	perspectives	on	my	interviewees.	The	freshmen,	for	example,	had	only	been	on	campus	for	a	couple	of	months	before	our	conversation	and	were	still	adjusting	to	campus	life.	A	study	that	includes	upperclassmen	participants	would	be	able	to	more	effectively	answer	the	question	of	whether	or	not	college	campuses	are	politically	polarizing	environments.				
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